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從習近平軍改探索其軍事戰略思維

洪耀南^{*}、白邦廷^{**}

摘要

習近平自2012年中共18大起，接替胡錦濤成為中共總書記、中共中央軍委會主席，再於2013年人大通過成為中國國家主席，集中共黨中央領導權、中國解放軍軍權、中國國家行政權，集黨政、軍權於一身。這是中共歷代領導人，除了毛澤東之外，擔任領導人之初就掌握黨、政、軍權的中國領導人。習近平擔任領導人後，對於中國國家體制、中國共產黨、中共解放軍開始進行一系列改革。改革目的隱含政治鬥爭，包含集權與肅清政敵之外，也確實反映習近平，對於黨、政、軍思想特色與個人色彩。改革的對象正是，中國在中國共產黨施政下的弊端。軍改是此次黨、政、軍改革中，最為劇烈與關鍵者。了解習近平推動軍改實際內涵，應可探索與掌握習近平戰略思維。

關鍵字：習近平、軍改、軍事戰略思維

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From Xi Jinping's Military Reforms to His Strategic Thinking: An Investigation

YAO-NAN HUNG^{} 、 PANG-TING PAI^{**}*

Abstract

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012, Xi Jinping has succeeded Hu Jintao and become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the Chairman of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. He then became President of China with the approval of the National People's Congress in 2013. Ever since then, he has grasped the power of the CPC leadership, the military power of the Chinese people's Liberation Army (PLA), and the administrative power of the state. Xi is the first leader of CPC and China, except for Mao Zedong, who has managed to grasp all the powers of the Party, the government, and the military at the beginning of his Party and State leadership. Since Xi Jinping became the leader, he has started to carry out a series of reform measures on the state system, the People's Liberation Army, and the Communist Party of China. These reforms were launched with an implicit purpose of political struggle, including the centralization of power and elimination of political enemies. Besides, the reforms also truly reflect Xi's ideological characteristics and personal color in terms of the party, the government, and the military. The reforms precisely aim at the malpractices of China under the administration of the Communist Party of China. Among Xi's reforms on the party, government, and the military,

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military reforms are the most drastic and crucial. With a deeper understanding of the actual significance of Xi's campaign of military reforms, we obtain more insight into his strategic thinking.

Key words: Xi Jinping, military reforms, military strategic thinking

I. Foreword

The substantial controlling and leading of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is an important source of powers for the national leader of China. The stability of the military systems of and personnel arrangements for the PLA has a direct influence on the stability of the CPC's governance of China. As the PLA plays such an important role in maintaining the stability of the regime, all the previous CPC leaders adopted policies that are more tolerant and less easy to change towards the institutions of the PLA in order to maintain the stability of the army. Only with a stable PLA can the administrative power of the CPC and the state remain secured. The stability of China, therefore, is based on the stability of the army.

Regarding the national vision of China, Xi Jinping proposed a “Chinese Dream” as he took office. The “Chinese Dream” policy essentially embodies a strong sense of “nationalism” and “revivalism” in that it addresses the Chinese people’s feelings of shame and inferiority in history, as well as their senses of vanity and honor about a strong and prosperous China in history. For the realization of this dream, moreover, Xi has further proposed a “Strong Army Dream,” with which he intends to support the Chinese Dream, bringing the Chinese nation back to the glories it used to enjoy, for military is the foundation of diplomatic and international negotiations in addition to economic developments.¹

There are two cornerstones for the Strong Army Dream. The first one is to strengthen the PLA’s combat capabilities. The military reforms that innovate the institutions and combat systems are supposed to strengthen PLA’s

¹ Yingxu Huang, “The Strong Army Dream in the Visual Threshold of the Chinese Dream,” *Study Times, People’s Daily Online-People’s Daily*, Jan. 27, 2014. (黃迎旭，〈中國夢視閾裡的強軍夢〉，學習時報、人民網—人民日報，2014年01月27日）

capabilities in terms of land, sea, and air joint operations and the long-range operations. In this way, the PLA can achieve the goal of three-dimensional operation in modern wars. Innovations of the military communication system, moreover, make sure that the PLA should be capable of, based on the working of this system, operating in long range and expanding and projecting forces. The second cornerstone is the vision that the PLA with stronger combat capabilities will uphold the prosperous Chinese Dream. As the Chinese Dream is rooted in the nationalist ideology that insists on the control of the traditional territories and the strong belief in historical dynasties, powerful military capabilities then serve as the foundation of such a dream before achieving the goal of “restoring to the normal condition.”²

According to Cheng-Kun Ma, China is a “revisionist” country that intends to change the status quo, and so are its state leaders. With abundant discontents and dissatisfactions over the current international situations and its own international status, China has evolved from a traditional revisionist to—with the effects of a certain historical complex—a “revivalist” that aims to restore its “normal status” in history. China believes that it has been treated unfairly because of its failures in modern history and that it has been in an “abnormal condition” in the international community. Bearing such revivalism in mind, China does not easily give up or shrink away even as the various measures it had taken to pursue the goal of restoring the national glory failed. Rather, it regards these failures as challenges on the path, which it should overcome by enhancing the various measures and increasing military capabilities, so as to accomplish the goal of rejuvenating the nation.³

² Guanghui Ni, “The Strong Army Dream Supports the Chinese Dream,” *People’s Daily Online-People’s Daily*, Oct. 15, 2017. (倪光輝，〈強軍夢支撐中國夢〉，人民網－人民日報，2017年10月15日)

³ Cheng-Kun Ma, “China’s Military Expansion and the Threat to Taiwan: Seeking Restoration of Historical Status,” *Prospect Quarterly* 20.2 (Apr. 2019): 1-48. (馬振坤，〈尋求恢復「歷史現狀」之中國軍事擴張與對臺威脅〉，遠景基金會季刊第二十卷第二期，2019年4月)

Xi Jinping's ideas and thinking of the Chinese Dream have been presented comprehensively in *The Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation*, written by Xi himself and compiled by the Party Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. According to those ideas and thinking, we can be more certain that Xi is a revivalist but not simply a revisionist. As the book describes, the Chinese Dream "represents is common ideal of people of all China's ethnic groups"; it "seeks to make the country prosperous and strong, rejuvenate the nation and make the people happy"; and, it "has become a powerful spiritual force that not only unites the hearts of the Party and the people but also inspires the Chinese people to strive for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." These strong senses of nationalism and revivalism are also clear in Xi's speeches: "[we ought to] realize the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation"⁴; "Chinese Dream is ultimately the people's dream"; "To realize the Chinese Dream, we must follow the Chinese road." Xi's ideas and thinking can be witnessed in all these remarks.⁵

Xi's philosophy of governance includes strong senses of nationalism and

⁴ These are seen in Xi's speech at a press conference held by the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee, entitled "To Realize the Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation": Our nation is a great nation. Throughout our civilization's more than 5,000 years of development, the Chinese nation made indelible contributions to the progress of human civilization. Since modern times, our nation has gone through untold tribulations and faced its gravest peril. Throughout that time, countless people with lofty ideals rose up in order to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but each time they failed. After the Communist Party of China (CPC) was founded, it rallied and led the people in making great sacrifices, forging ahead against all odds, and transforming poor and backward old China into an increasingly prosperous and powerful new China, thus opening completely new horizons for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Nov. 15, 2012.

⁵ Jinping Xi, *The Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation*, compiled by the Party Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, December 2013. (習近平，《習近平關於實現中華民族偉大復興的中國夢論述摘編》，中共中央文獻研究室編，2013年12月）

revivalism, which can be seen in how he uses the Chinese Dream as his slogan. Chinese revivalism originated from its modern history: its defeat in wars led to a low status in the international community and a strong sense of frustration. The failures of military campaigns in history have been considered as the beginning of the failures of China, and therefore the military power has come to play an important role in backing the Chinese rejuvenation. Without the support of the Strong Army Dream, the Chinese Dream alone is not able to accomplish the rejuvenation of the glory that China once had in history. It is also with an attention to its own history, moreover, that China focuses on military powers for its national development. Since the Chinese Dream is based on military strength, reforming and thus bolstering the military system is also a part of the Chinese Dream.

II. Xi Jinping's Military Reforms

In the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping is the first leader, except for Mao Zedong, who has managed to control the Party's administrative and military affairs at taking office as the General Secretary of the CPC. In the following year, Xi smoothly took over as the President of the People's Republic of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China, hence the paramount leader of China.⁶

Xi started to gradually carry out his military reforms after having secured his power in the CPC. In 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China deliberated and passed the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some

⁶ "Xi Jinping: The Chinese Leader Who Grasps All Powers of the Party, the Administration, and the Military," *BBC Chinese Network*, Mar. 14, 2013. (BBC中文網，〈习近平：集党政军大权于一身的领导人〉，2013年3月14日）

Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms.” As the drafter of this *Decision*, Xi established the directions and goals for future reforms.⁷

In this *Decision*, while the contents of the reforms mostly involve internal and economic affairs, there are three main objectives for the reforms that are relevant to the national defense and military: 1) deepening the reforms and adjustment of the institutions and establishments of the military systems; 2) furthering the reforms and adjustments of military policies and systems; and, 3) promoting the in-depth development of the military-civilian integration. The *Decision* does not include any detailed explanations or methods concerning the actual reforms and contents; it only establishes the legal aspect and fundamental nature of the reforms.⁸

As Xi proposed the *Decision* on some major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reforms, meanwhile he also signaled that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must reform. Regarding specifically the above-mentioned three objective, his main announcement includes the following key points: 1) issues concerning the management and structure of the active-duty forces; 2) compensations and work arrangements for military veterans; and, 3) industrial issues concerning the military-civilian integration.⁹

After announcing his plans for the PLA-related reforms at the end of 2013, Xi started to serve personally as the Leader of the Leading Group for

⁷ “Source: Decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms,” *BBC Chinese Network*, Nov. 15, 2013. (BBC中文網，〈資料：三中全會全面深化改革若干重大問題的決定〉，2013年11月15日)

⁸ “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms,” *Xinhua News*, Nov. 15, 2013. (新华社，〈中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定〉，2013年11月15日)

⁹ Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “Opening a New Era and New Situation for the In-Depth Development of the Military-Civilian Integration.” Released by Guoqiang Ren, Senior Colonel and Spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China. Mar. 29, 2018. (中國國防部，〈開創新時代軍民融合深度發展新局面〉，國防部新聞發言人任國強大校，2018年03月29)

Deepening Reforms of the National Defense and the Military of the Central Military Commission in 2014. In the history of the CPC, Xi is the first to serve in this position while at the same time also being the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, the President of China, and the Chairman of Central Military Commission. This shows how Xi takes the military reforms highly seriously and handles them with such caution that he chose to assume actual leadership, take charge of the reforms in person, and face the potential retaliation from the PLA.¹⁰

After grasping power, Xi proposed military reforms to accelerate renovating the PLA and therefore, undoubtedly, has faced challenges and crisis from the existing power structure of the PLA. Before the military reforms, the powers of the PLA were mainly under the control of the four main General Departments and the commanders of military regions, forming a complex and intertwined power structure. Since the 18th National Congress, Xi has sped up eliminating the old powers in the PLA by means of anti-corruption measures. The dismissal of General Xu Caihou in 2014, for example, can be understood as Xi's first step of taking actions on the PLA's high-ranking generals. Following that, other generals, including Guo Boxiong, Tian Xiusi, Wang Jianping, Wang Xibin, Zhang Yang, and Fang Fenghui, stepped down from power, showing that Xi Jinping managed to remove the old powers from the PLA, and that such old powers had also attempted to hinder Xi's efforts to carry out reforms. Through the severe punishments of the PLA's high-ranking generals, Xi has not only emphatically announced his determination on reforming the political and military supervision systems but also eliminated the PLA factions that past leaders had left over. In this way, Xi has managed to dissolve the connections between older powers and the PLA and reassign new personnel to the vacant

¹⁰ “Xi Jinping Took Office as the Leader of the Group for Deepening Reforms of the CPC Central Military Commission,” *BBC Chinese Network*, Dec. 30, 2013. (BBC中文網，〈習近平出任中共中央深化改革小組組長〉，2013年12月30日）

posts, thus forming a new power structure.¹¹

II. A. The Basic Spirits of the Military Reforms

In November 2015, Xi Jinping convened the Reform Work Meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), as all conditions and powers had been gradually stabilized after two years of preparation and coordination. During the meeting, Xi announced in person to the CPC and PLA the actual practices and implementation rules of the reforms. He also pointed out that the military reforms should be centered on three core spirits, which would also serve as the foundation of the reforms and the basis for Xi's stabilized regime.

II. A. 1. Fully implement the strategies of reforming and strengthening the army, following the road of strengthening the army with Chinese characteristics with all determination: Reasons for the military reforms

The core spirit of this statement here is to provide an explication and objective for the military reforms. It establishes that the military reforms are for the purpose of strengthening the combat capabilities of the PLA. For this goal, the reforms will revolutionize the systems of the PLA and build an army for the new era, so as to make the PLA more capable in the face of the challenges and changes in the new era. All measures of the military reforms are devised for the goal of achieving the Strong Army Dream, which is the very support of Xi's Chinese Dream. For the gradual processes and goals that entail strengthening

¹¹ Kao-cheng Wang, "The Significance and Influences of the Chinese Army's Anti-Corruption Measures of the Army of Mainland China," *Briefing on the Cross-Strait and Mainland Situations*, released by the Mainland Affairs Council, February 2005. (王高成，〈大陸軍隊反貪腐的意義與影響〉，陸委會發表大陸與兩岸情勢簡報，2005年2月）

the PLA through military reforms, upholding the Chinese Dream with the Strong Army Dream, and accomplishing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through the Chinese Dream, therefore, the military reforms are the essential foundation of all the steps, an imperative that Xi must carry out.¹²

(1)以習近平同志為核心的黨中央領導推動的這場偉大的變革-習近平親自操刀

II. A. 2. These great changes are launched by the leadership of the CPC's Central Committee, in which Xi Jinping plays the core role: Xi in-person guidance

The core spirit of this statement here is to establish to whom the supreme power belongs concerning the command and decision-making of the military reforms: it is from the personal determination and strong will of Xi Jinping himself, the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, President of China, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, that the current military reforms originated. This statement demonstrates Xi's confidence in his control over the Chinese regime. It is also a reannouncement that, even though the Communist Party of China relies much on the PLA to maintain its regime in China, the PLA must be subordinated to the CPC, and the future and institutions of the army must be controlled in Xi's hands. In addition to showing his authority over the power of the CPC, Xi's announcement here also exerts the effect of deterring the PLA, hence reducing the PLA's influences on the

¹² Xiaonan Ye, "By Reforming and Strengthening the Army, We Unswervingly Walk on the Path of the Strong Army with Chinese Characteristics: Comment Series, No. 7, for the 5th Anniversary of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee." *People's Daily Online: People's Daily Overseas Edition*, Jan. 16, 2019. (葉曉楠,〈改革強軍 堅定不移走中國特色強軍之路--十八屆三中全會5周年系列述評之七〉,人民網-人民日報海外版,2019年01月16日)

stability of the Chinese administration.¹³

II. A. 3. With the spirit of self-revolution and tenacious courage and determination, the People's Army has embarked on a new journey of strengthening and rejuvenating the army: Strengthen the rationality of the military reforms by linking to the communist spirit of constant revolutions and combining with the basic doctrines.

The core spirit of this statement here is to add the Communist Party's basic doctrines into the rationality and necessity of the military reforms, which can also serve as a vindication for the CPC's command and leadership. The status of the military reforms has thus been enhanced by the spirit of self-revolution. As self-revolution and constant revolutions are the two main mechanisms of renewal and elimination within the communist party, combining the military reforms and the core spirits of the CPC can be seen as a clever maneuver.

According to this spirit, all the changes and adjustments of the PLA will be deemed as part of the self-revolution of the communist party. Under the banner of revolutionary action, all measures can be enforced, and all arrangements are for the success of the revolution. The PLA can only accept and give in to the self-revolution, and therefore the PLA must be tenacious and determined in the face of military reforms.¹⁴

¹³ “Great Changes, Historical Leaps: Leadership of the CPC's Central Committee in Which Xi Jinping Plays a Core Role, and the Promoting of a Strong Army. A Documentary, Part 3,” *Xinhua News*, Sep. 10, 2017. (新華社，〈偉大的變革，歷史的跨越-以習近平同志為核心的黨中央領導和推進強軍興軍紀實之三〉，2017年09月10日)

¹⁴ Guanghui Ni, “Fully Implement the Strategies of Reforming and Strengthening the Army (Hundred Years of Struggle and Setting Out a New Journey),” *People's Daily Online-People's Daily*, Apr. 30, 2021. (倪光輝，〈全面實施改革強軍戰略（奮斗百年路 啟航新征程）〉，人民網-人民日報，2021年04月30日)

With above three main basic spirits, Xi not only manifested his resolution to implement the military reform but also ensured the various foundations of the reforms. Having secured foundations, Xi then launched the military reforms of the largest scale since the establishment of the CPC and PLA. These reforms broadly cover the institutions and managements of the entire PLA: from the personnel of the army, the military education, the military commands, to the retirement system and the recruitment of military civilians, and so on, all these aspects are planned to undergo considerable adjustments.

II. B. Changes of Power Structure and Institutions in the Military Reforms

After inspecting the various measures of the military reforms, we have identified two key points worth studying, analyzing, and discussing. The first one is the changes and centralization of power distribution: the commanding powers that used to be held separately by the four General Departments are now centralized back into the Central Military Commission. Secondly, the deployment of the PLA combat forces has been adjusted, including the deployment units that have been changed from military regions to theater commands, and the responsibilities and assignments of the military commanders within the regions, as well as the concomitant reorganization of military powers and redistribution of various other powers.

II. B. 1. Changes and centralization of power distribution

Before the military reforms, the power structure of the PLA was relatively more vertical and centralized: the Central Military Commission (CMC) is the highest leading body, and the powers are divided into the management of four General Departments: i.e., the General Staff Department (GSD), General

Political Department (GPD), the General Logistics Department (GLD), and the General Armaments Department (GAD) of the PLA. Military-related powers were highly concentrated in the hands of these four departments' leaders. Down from the leadership of the CMC at the top of the power structure, the heads of the departments are authorized to act on behalf of the CMC and even replace some of the functional authorities of the CMC.¹⁵

For Xi's military reforms, the uttermost priority is to break up the existing power structure and then recentralize it. Firstly, Xi decentralized the powers that had originally been gathered in the four General Departments and redistributed them into new organizations or agencies. Then, under the leadership of the CMC, Xi reorganized the original four General Departments into seven departments, three committees, and five directly affiliated institutions. On the surface, professions and authorities are clearly divided into different departments.¹⁶

First refining and fragmenting the existing power structure, then replacing it with a new power structure, and eventually gathering the powers back to the CMC, these steps are the important characteristics of Xi's military reforms. After the original four General Departments had been divided and reorganized into new departments, committees, and directly affiliated institutions, these latter units all became administrative agencies of the CMC, with their main tasks being assisting the CMC to handle the development of relevant military affairs. The military powers, in other words, all came back to the CMC in a

¹⁵ Hung-Bo Huang, "Xi Jinping's 'Comprehensive Implementation of the Strategies of Reforming and Strengthening the Army': A Review and Commentary of Xi's Deepening of Reforms on National Defense and Army," *Prospect & Exploration* 14.1 (Jan 2016). (黃鴻博, 習近平《全面實施改革強軍戰略》:深化國防和軍隊改革述評,展望與探索月刊,第14卷第1期。2016年1月)

¹⁶ Yixin Shen and Hui Sheng, eds., "The Reorganization of the Central Military Commission into Fifteen Functional Departments," *China Youth Daily & People's Daily*, Jan. 12, 2016. (《中国青年报》,〈中央军委机关改为十五个职能部门〉,人民網,责编:申亚欣、盛卉,2016年01月12日)

roundabout way, and this is how Xi Jinping, Chairman of the CMC, achieved the goal of changing and recentralizing the powers after power redistribution.¹⁷

II. B. 2. Adjustments of the PLA's Deployment

Before the military reforms, the forces of the PLA used to be deployed mainly according to the seven main military regions. Under the jurisdiction of military regions were various corps and logistics; the military services were coordinated combat units and did not have the authority to command or dispatch. It was the commanders of the military regions who held the actual military powers. Concerning military commands, it was not the CMC that directly commanded the regional commanders. Rather, the highest command power over the military belonged to the power holder of the General Staff Department, namely the Chief of General Staff, forming a four-tier chain of command: the CMC commanded the Chief of General Staff, who in turn commanded the commanders of the military regions, who in turn commanded military forces in operation. The CMC, in other words, was merely a commanding unit, but not a real power holder.¹⁸

After Xi Jinping's military reforms, however, the system based on military regions was changed into a system based on military theaters. On the surface, this change is an adjustment of the zones of military defense, a new deployment of the PLA forces responding to the challenges of the new era and new international situations. In fact, this new system was formed in response to the adjustment of power structure of the original four General Departments and the

¹⁷ Wen Li, "Observation: Who Has the Authority to Lead China's Armed Forces?" *BBC Chinese Network*, Jan 28, 2015. (BBC中文網，〈觀察：誰有權領導中國的武裝力量？〉，2015年1月28日)

¹⁸ Shuh-Fan Ding, "Xi Jinping's Power and Will: An Assessment of Xi's Military Reform," *Prospect & Exploration* 16.2 (Feb. 2018). (丁樹範，〈個人權力與意志的結合 — 評習近平強軍戰略部署與成效〉，展望與探索月刊，第16卷第2期，2018年2月)

changed authorities of regional commanders.

For the traditional military structure of the PLA, the land force played the predominant role, and it was difficult to adjust the strategic layout and force structure in the military region system. For the adjustment of military theaters, therefore, the “sea-air joint operation” is of uttermost importance. In this new system, all troops are under direct command of military theaters, which oversee wartime operations. The advantages include clear delineation of responsibilities and the three-tier chain of command, in which the CMC commands the theater commanders, who commands the forces in operation.

In the history of the PLA, its primary policy was mostly dominated by the land defense policy in the tradition of continental army; as a result, the land force used to play a leading and predominant role in the PLA. Before the military reforms, the chiefs of the four General Departments and the commanders of the seven main military regions had all been army generals of the PLA, thus making the military leadership long dominated by the ground army system, which had also long held control over the pre-reform General Staff Department. There had been Navy Force Command, Air Force Command, and Second Artillery Corps in the pre-reform system of the PLA but no Land Force Command, showing how “Big Army Mentality” had been the unique characteristic of the PLA.¹⁹

Since the launch of the military reforms, the army, navy, air force, rocket force, and the strategic support force have all become parallel military services, and the land force has no longer enjoyed any privileged treatment or status but merely one of the military forces. This change has not only helped to achieve the coordinated operations of land, sea, and air forces but also enhanced the status of the navy and air force, thus fulfilling China’s needs to expand defense

¹⁹ Kao-cheng Wang, “Paths and Challenges of Xi Jinping’s Military Reforms,” *Exchange Magazine of the Straits Exchange Foundation*, vol. 146 (Apr. 2016). (王高成，〈習近平的軍改之路與挑戰〉，財團法人海峽交流基金會交流雜誌，146期，2016年4月）

capabilities in the international situations.²⁰

Xi's military reforms have divided and reorganized the powers of the original four General Departments; one of the results of this restructuring was the establishment of the Ground Force Headquarter of the PLA. In addition to the power redistribution, the more important aspect is the power-balancing among different military forces, which have also become specialized organizations purely for the purpose of military combat and supporting the theater operations. The responsibilities of building military forces, moreover, have also come to the forces themselves; this is what the official language calls the goal of "Military Commission being in charge of the general, the theaters in charge of warfare, and the forces in charge of force building."²¹

II. C. Military Judicial and Supervisory Systems Changed by the Military Reforms

Apart from the changes in authorities, power-balance of military forces, and military regions, there is another important renovation in this series of military reforms in the aspect of military powers: namely, the judicial reform of the PLA, which aims to re-establish the military discipline and Xi Jinping's absolute authority in the PLA.²²

²⁰ Chunmei Feng and Zuocheng Li, "Vision of the National Defense, Interview at High-End: To Build a Powerful and Modernized New Type of Army," *People's Daily Online-People's Daily*, Jan. 31, 2016. (馮春梅、李作成, 〈國防視線·高端訪問：建設強大的現代化新型陸軍〉, 人民網－人民日報, 2016年01月31日)

²¹ Jianwei Hou, "Accelerating the Coupling of the Functions of Military Theaters in Charge of Warfare and Forces in Charge or Force Building," *People's Liberation Army Daily*, ed. Qiuli Liu, Jun. 7, 2016. (侯建偉, 〈加快實現戰區主戰與軍種主建的功能耦合〉, 解放軍報, 責任編輯: 劉秋麗, 2016年6月7日)

²² Yuwen Deng, "The Second Term of Xi Jinping's Administration: Debut of a Perfect Totalitarian," *New York Times, Chinese Edition*, Nov. 11, 2019. (鄧聿文, 〈習近平執政第二季：完美極權登場〉, 紐約時報新聞網, 2019年11月11日)

In the past, the PLA used to have its own military systems of investigation, trial, and supervision; it also held control over the audit system for the write-off of military expenditures. The impartiality and authority of the judicial and supervision systems of the PLA had long been very low, with constant cases of corruption and use of military supplies for personal profit, cracking down the prestige of the central regime of the CPC. In Xi's military reforms, the judicial reform contains two key tasks.²³

The first is to innovate and change “the system of discipline and supervision and the institution of inspection tour,” targeting at the inefficiency of the military law system and the insufficiency of supervision. The second is to improve the “system and mechanism of audit” in the military, so as to solve the malpractices in this system. The problems of the PLA’s audit system originated from the PLA’s entrepreneurial practices, i.e., engaging in business activities, which allowed the PLA to mix the use of business profit and state budget, thus becoming problems and malpractices in the long run. These are the two priorities of judicial reform in Xi’s military reforms.²⁴

II. C. 1. The system of discipline and supervision and the institution of inspection tour

As to the specific measures regarding “the system of discipline and supervision and the institution of inspection tour,” Xi removed the power

²³ “The Promulgation of ‘Establishing a Sound System for Punishing and Preventing Corruption: The Work Plan (2013-2017)’,” *Xinhua News*, Dec. 25, 2013. (新華社，〈《建立健全懲治和預防腐敗體系2013-2017年工作規劃》頒布〉，2013年12月25日)

²⁴ Jianwei Liu, “Press Conference Q&A of the Training and Administration Department, Central Military Commission, Concerning the Release and Implementation of the ‘Trial Regulation on the Supervision of Military Training (Pilot Run).’” *Press Release of the Ministry of National Defense of China, People’s Liberation Army Daily*, Feb. 12, 2019. (劉建偉，〈軍委訓練管理部領導就發布施行《中國人民解放軍軍事訓練監察條例（試行）》答記者問〉，中國國防部新聞稿，解放軍報，2019年2月12日)

of supervision from the institution which it had previously belonged to: the Department of Discipline and Inspection, General Political Department, PLA. The Discipline and Inspection Commission that had formerly been under the General Political Department. After the reorganization of the General Political Department and other General Departments, however, the work of discipline maintenance of the PLA has officially been removed from the “political work cadre system” of the PLA and has become directly overseen by the CMC.²⁵

In the post-reform system, the CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection takes charge of the work of discipline inspection, making the power of supervision return to the hands of the CMC. Moreover, this has also formed a dual-track supervision system between the central and military units, which not only lets the power of military supervision return to the hands of the central government but also prevents the malpractices caused by military supervision units carrying out independent supervision. This aspect of reform, in other words, provide a good institution and system of supervision for Xi’s anti-corruption efforts.²⁶

II. C. 2. Improve the system and mechanism of audit

Concerning the issue of how to improve the system and mechanism of audit, corruption and lack of transparency of the audit system had long been the main problem about which the Central Committee of the CPC had been

²⁵ Jin-Ping Chen and I-Chih Chang, “The Research on the Organization and Functions of Political Work Department of People’s Republic of China Central Military Commission After Military Reform,” *Publication of Military Social Science* 15 (Aug. 2019): 27-50. (陳津萍、張貽智，〈軍改後中共「中央軍委政治工作部」組織與職能之研究〉，軍事社會科學專刊，第15期，頁27-50，2019年8月)

²⁶ Dongjun, “Posted to ‘Full Coverage’ and Supervision ‘with No Exception’,” *People’s Daily-Chinese Communist Party News*, Dec. 12, 2014. (冬君，〈派駐“全覆蓋”，監督“無例外”〉，人民網－中國共產黨新聞網，2014年12月12日)

criticizing the PLA, and which were officially surfaced because of the Gu Junshan corruption case in 2012.²⁷ The reform over the audit system in the military reforms, moreover, is also related to the power reform of the four General Departments.²⁸

For the original audit department of the PLA, it was the Audit Office, under the General Logistics Department, that took charge of relevant administrative works. After the reorganization of the General Logistics Department and other General Departments, the Audit Office became a unit managed by the CMC, reporting all administrative works and reports to it. In this way, the audit power has been returned to the CMC.²⁹

Xi's reforms targeting at the military systems of audit, supervision, jurisdiction have resulted in the various powers going back to the CMC. These reforms can be seen as Xi's continuous plans for power transition following the division and reorganization of the formerly four General Departments. In this way, Xi has not only firmly established the innovated systems and institutions of the PLA but also manifested his authority as the supreme leader of the PLA.

II. D. Establishment and Enhancement of Military Forces

In the “People’s Liberation Army’s Leading Organs, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force Inaugural Meeting” at the end of 2015, Xi Jinping

²⁷ Xi Lu, “Gu Jushan, China’s ‘Military Tiger,’ Sentenced to Death with Reprieve and Deprived of Rank of Lieutenant General,” *BBC Chinese Network*, Aug. 10, 2015. (BBC中文網, 〈中國軍內「老虎」谷俊山判死緩剝奪中將軍銜〉, 2015年8月10日)

²⁸ Jingyao Pan, “New Characteristics of the Corruption of ‘Military Tigers’: Sufficient Colleagues, Predecessors, and Successors,” *People’s Daily-Current Affairs Channel*, Jan. 16, 2015. (潘婧瑤, 〈“軍老虎”腐敗呈現新特點：不乏同事、前后任〉, 人民網-時政頻道, 2015年01月16日)

²⁹ Jingsi Ye. “China’s Fight against Corruption: The Central Military Commission Takes Over PLA’s Audit Office,” *BBC Chinese Network*, Nov. 6, 2014. (BBC中文網, 〈中國反腐敗：中央軍委接管解放軍審計署〉, 2014年11月6日)

announced and gave flags to the establishment of these new military institutions, as well as declared his guidance to these newly established departments and forces.³⁰

Regarding the official establishment of the ground force organization, Xi demanded that the army should be innovated and should “achieve the transformation from the type of regional defense to that of global warfare.”³¹

Regarding the enhancement of the Rocket Force, Xi affirmed his “strategic demand of global deterrence, including enhancing the credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capabilities.”³²

For the Strategic Support Force (SSF), Xi indicated that it is “a new type of combat force in safeguarding national security and an important growth point for our army’s new-quality combat capabilities.”³³

The establishment of the SSF not only signifies that the wartime communications and intelligence resources have come back to the central government but also plays a significant role in the integration and energy concentration of the various departments of the PLA. The SSF includes the

³⁰ Xuanliang Li, Xuanjie Zhang, and Qinghua Li, “Army Leading Organs, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force Established in Beijing, as Xi Jinping Gave Flags and Speech to the Army, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force,” *Xinhua News*, Jan. 1, 2016. (李宣良、張選杰、李清華，〈陸軍領導機構火箭軍戰略支援部隊成立大會在京舉行 习近平向中國人民解放軍陸軍火箭軍戰略支援部隊授軍旗並致訓詞〉，新華社刊登，2016年1月1日)

³¹ Zhisheng Lu, “In an Age of Global Warfare, Our New Army is Faced with These Challenges,” *People’s Liberation Army Daily & People’s Daily*, Sep. 14, 2017. (解放軍報，〈全域作戰時代，新型陸軍面臨這些挑戰〉，刊登於人民網，2017年09月14日)

³² Jiquan Wang and Jiaqi Yan, “Breaking! Flag of the Rocket Force Revealed!,” *China Military Online & People’s Daily*, Aug. 18, 2016. (中國軍網，〈重磅新聞！火箭軍軍旗曝光！〉，刊登於人民網，2016年08月18日)

³³ Tianjiao Jiang, “Strategic Support Force: Enhancing the New-Quality Combat Capabilities,” *Economic Daily & Chinese Communist Party News*, Feb. 14, 2016. (經濟日報，〈戰略支援部隊：提升新質戰鬥力〉，刊登於中國共產黨新聞網，2016年02月14日)

departments of aerospace, intelligence, and network operations of the PLA.³⁴

Additionally, the SSF also integrates PLA-related communications and network operations. The SSF represents both the extended capabilities of military communications and the changes in military strategies.³⁵

III. Impacts of Xi Jinping's Military Reforms on the PLA

Xi Jinping's military reforms have brought comprehensive and fundamental changes onto the PLA. From the leadership structure on the top to the troop management at the lower level, as well as from the strategic layout at the deeper level to the tactical arrangement at the more surface level, Xi's military reforms have changed all these aspects. We analyze on how the change of the military regions into theaters of operation has had impacts on the PLA. As the changes in military defense regions have caused changes in the overall military strategies, this section focuses on the extent of the changes and the results of the implementation.

III. A. The Impact of Changing the Military Regions into Theaters of Operation on the PLA

Before the military reforms, the deployment of the PLA was in the layout of the seven military regions, which illustrated a “Big Army Mentality” and the

³⁴ Ying-Yu Lin, “Mission and Scale of the Chinese Communist Party’s Strategic Support Force,” *Prospect & Explorations* 15.10 (2007): 102-28. (林穎佑，〈中共戰略支援部隊的任務與規模〉，展望與探索月刊第15卷10期，2007年)

³⁵ Jianqun Teng and Fenliang Liu, “Interpretation: How Important is the Force Newly Established by the CMC?,” *CCTV Network*, Sep. 14, 2016. (滕建群、劉分良〈解讀：中央軍委剛剛成立的這支部隊有多重要？〉，刊登於央視新聞網，2016年9月14日)

strategic implications, traditionally held by the PLA, of “active defense” and “luring the enemy deep.” Under the thinking of military regions, ground force was still the main focus of the military developments and resource distributions of the PLA, whereas the navy and air force played a cooperative role in coordinated operations.³⁶

When the Communist Party of China (CPC) established its governance, the PLA’s key tasks were maintaining the CPC’s political power and defending against foreign enemies. The Strong Army Dream and Chinese Dream proposed by Xi Jinping demands that the PLA should adopt an expansionary defense policy, making the concept and layout of the military regions appear backward and obsolete.³⁷

As the system of military regions were changed to that of theaters of warfare in Xi’s military reforms, this change shows not only a reform in the leadership power in the system but also the important strategic transformation of the core ideas: i.e., how such ideas came to focus on the initiatives of “theaters being in charge of warfare,” and “the forces being in charge of force building.” Under this establishment, the theater commanders are responsible for combat training in peacetime and all military activities during wartime.³⁸

The tasks of the theater commanders, in this way, have become simplified and professionalized. Besides, the drills and preparations should be carried out by means of various battles in peacetime exercises. The various forces

³⁶ “The Beginning of Normalizing and Modernizing the Military,” *Chinese Communist Party Network, Party History Research Office of the Central Committee of the CPC*, Mar. 21, 2017. (中國共產黨歷史網，〈軍隊正規化現代化建設的起步〉，中共中央黨史研究室，2017年03月21日)

³⁷ “90th Anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: The History of the Chinese Communist Army You May Not Know,” *BBC Chinese Network*, Jul. 31, 2017. (BBC中文網，〈解放軍建軍90週年：你可能不知道的中共軍史〉，2017年7月31日)

³⁸ Jiang Chuan, “News Background: Chinese Army and Generals After a New Round of Shuffle,” *BBC Chinese Network*, Feb. 3, 2016. (BBC中文網，〈新聞背景：完成新一輪洗牌後的中國軍隊及將領〉，2016年2月3日)

in a theater undergo mixed and collective combat training altogether under the command of the theater commander, hence gradually cultivating the joint operation of different forces of the PLA. Under the theater system, the navy, army, and air force can carry out joint exercises, helping to achieve the expected goal of “three-dimensional operation.”³⁹

When war breaks up, the theater commanders are responsible for war leadership and demonstrate the combat capabilities constructed in peacetime. For the PLA, changing the military regions into theaters of operation shows not only a reform on institution and systems but also an innovation of overall combat concepts and strategic development. To other countries, such reforms declared the end of an era when the PLA was dominated by “Big Army” as well as manifest the PLA’s confidence in developing its navy and air forces.

In terms of strategic transformation, Xi still uses “active defense” as the strategic indicator of the PLA as he holds office. Alongside with the conceptual change shown in the change of military regions into theaters, however, the strategic implication is now fundamentally different than before. As analyzed below, the same phrase “active defense” has gained a different nature and meaning since the military regions were transformed into theaters.⁴⁰

For the PLA, “active defense” used to be a strategic guidance concerning the borderlines of China. The active defense meant that the PLA should be active about border security but not the literal sense of taking defense as the only means. In the Korean war, for example, the PLA crossed the border in reaction to the imminent threat posed by the US army on the Chinese border.

³⁹ Bo Yuan, “Commander of Eastern Theater in Interview Introduces a Theater’s Main Duties,” *China Military Online & People’s Daily*, Mar. 4, 2016. (中國軍網，〈東部戰區司令員接受採訪介紹戰區主要職責〉，刊登於人民網，2016年03月04日）

⁴⁰ Lei He, “Why We Always Follow a Defensive National Defense Policy,” *People’s Liberation Army Daily*, released in the Ministry of National Defense of People’s Republic of China, Aug. 31, 2019. (何雷，〈我們為什麼始終奉行防衛性國防政策〉，解放軍報刊登於中華人民共和國國防部，2019年8月31日）

The “active defense,” then, meant the use of active military actions to defend the border but not military strategy of aggression and expansion.⁴¹

With the innovated concepts of theaters of operation, the idea of “active defense” has become largely different than before. In the former system of military regions, the policy of active defense helped form a strategic guidance and tactical execution based on a concept of conservative defense and the army-based system. In the current system of theaters of operation, on the other hand, mixed forces and three-dimensional operation have become the main tactical execution; also, the PLA now holds a difference concept of traditional national borders. With the navy and air force that have been the focus of development in the reforms, “active defense” has become a strategic guidance with ideas of expansion.⁴²

The PLA’s concept of border has been expanded from inland to sea, corresponding to Xi’s concept of maritime expansion based on Chinese history. The same task of defending the territory for the PLA now has become a strategic guidance with a strongly aggressive mindset due to the joint-force nature of the theaters. Active military operations have turned into a massive advancement of the military energy of the PLA navy and air force. The concept of defense, moreover, has turned into massive army building and investment in military expenditure, turning the PLA into a defensive force with strong

⁴¹ Ruixue Bai, Jingguo Wang, and Yalin Hao, “Military Expert: ‘China Always Follows a Defensive National Defensive Policy’,” *Xinhua News*, release in *Interpretation of Policies and Regulations of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China*, Jan. 20, 2009. (白瑞雪、王經國、郝亞琳，〈軍事專家：“中國永遠奉行防禦性的國防政策”〉，新華社刊登於中華人民共和國中央人民政府網政策法規解讀，2009年1月20日）

⁴² Cheng-Jung Lin, “The National Defense Law Shows China’s Strategy Moving from ‘Active Defense’ to ‘Pre-Emptive Defense,’” Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts, Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, Taiwan), Jan. 12, 2021. (林政榮，〈中共最新《國防法》彰顯戰略從積極防禦趨向先制主動〉，財團法人國防安全研究院（台灣），中共政軍與作戰概念研究所，2021年01月12日）

offensive power.⁴³

III. B. Enhancement of the PLA's Overseas Combat Capabilities

In the system of military regions before Xi's military reforms, the commanders of the military regions were the core of leadership, who were not responsible for the management and building of the navy and air force in peacetime. The primary focus of this system was still the thinking of army management and the development of ground force. In this system and model of management based on military regions, the PLA had rather low capabilities of overseas combat capabilities in modern warfare, which depend considerably on the navy and air force. The long-term efforts and military capabilities of the PLA were mainly seen in the maintenance of the traditional land borders.⁴⁴

Before the reforms, the navy and air force were limited by the system and therefore had insufficient energy for military power projection and far-sea strikes; as a result, the PLA had poor military expansion capabilities. Since the military reforms, on the other hand, the PLA has been implementing the principles of "Military Commission being in charge of the general, the theaters in charge of warfare, and the forces in charge of force building." Hence, the navy and air force have obtained an equal status with the ground force, with tremendous room and resources for growth and fundamental renovations in terms of renewed weaponry and personnel staffing.⁴⁵

⁴³ Jianqun Teng, "View: Chinese Army Is Opening a New Era of Active Defense," *BBC Chinese Network*, Oct. 23, 2017. (滕建群，〈觀點：中國軍隊正開啟積極防禦新時代〉，刊登於 BBC 中文網，2017 年 10 月 23 日)

⁴⁴ "Assessment of China's Political and Military Development, 2018," Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, Taiwan), December 2018. (財團法人國防安全研究院(台灣)，〈2018 中共政軍發展評估報告〉，2018 年 12 月)

⁴⁵ Fang Liang, "The Position and Mission of Forces under the Joint Operation System," *National Defense Reference*, released on the Ministry of National Defense of People's Republic of China website, Jan. 14, 2016. (梁芳，〈聯合作戰體制下軍種的定位和使命〉，國防參考

The transformation of the system of military regions into theaters and the adjustment of the status of ground, navy, and air force, as discussed above, have made the PLA a military force capable of overseas strikes. The pre-reform system of military regions was based on a concept of jurisdiction, which had formed an inland type of strategic thinking and combat policy. The post-reform system of theaters of operation, contrarily, the concept of regional jurisdiction has been replaced by a focus on the preparations of strategic directions. Each of theaters is supposed to prepare for war, and the preparations include Xi's strategic directions.

The PLA announced the establishment of two new forces after having completed the building of military forces and defined clearly the strategic positions, and these new forces have fundamental influences on the PLA's overseas operations and military projection. These two new forces, one as a type of military force and the other a division of troops, respectively, are the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force (SSF). The former was previously the Second Artillery Corps of the PLA.

The enhancement of the Rocket Force can be understood as the PLA's emphasis on and improvement of the missile firepower. The elevation of an artillery corps into the status of a PLA Force is also an official announcement of the PLA's emphasis on long-range strikes, especially missile strikes. The fact that the uses of missile attacks and nuclear weapons are directly under the order of the CMC, moreover, also ensures that any missile attack complies with the leadership and authorization of the Chinese central government.⁴⁶

The Strategic Support Force (SSF), on the other hand, is responsible for the following tasks for the PLA: gathering intelligence and preparing for

刊登於中華人民共和國國防部網站，2016年1月14日）

⁴⁶ “Why was the Second Artillery Corps Elevated to be the Fourth Force, the Rocket Force?,” *People's Daily*, Jan. 8, 2016. (人民網，〈二炮為何要升格為第四大軍種火箭軍？〉，2016年1月8日）

cyber operations before war, as well as ensuring relevant communications and intelligence in wartime. The SSF can be regarded as a symbol of the PLA's determination and strength in expansion. The SSF integrates the “C4ISR”-i.e., military operations including Command、Control、Communications、Computers、Intelligence、Surveillance、Reconnaissance- of the PLA and therefore ensures that, in terms of overseas operations, the PLA is capable of coordinating the horizontal intelligence exchange and the vertical chains of command. In this way, the long-range combat capabilities of the PLA have been substantially improved.⁴⁷

III. C. Impacts of Xi's Military Reforms on the PLA

The military reforms have transformed the PLA from a force of local defense largely based on ground force into a combat force, based on strategic directions, capable of sea-air joint operations and overseas strikes. Different from the previously inward-looking force of defense, in other words, the PLA has now become an outward-looking force of expansion.⁴⁸

The impacts of the military reforms on the PLA have begun with the Chinese Dream-namely, Xi Jinping's philosophy of governance based on an ideal of achieving illusory territory and pursuing the bygone prosperity of ancient China, which all require the PLA's solid backing. The PLA was not able to achieve the goal of expanding China's territories to satisfy Xi's ideal level in the pre-reform systems. Therefore, Xi has made efforts through his

⁴⁷ Tianliang Xiao, “Follow the Trend of Military Reforms and Grasp the Initiative of Innovation,” People’s Liberation Army, released on *People’s Daily*, Jan. 5, 2016. (肖天亮，〈順應軍事變革潮流把握改革主動〉，解放軍刊登於人民網，2016年1月5日)

⁴⁸ The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” government white paper released on *People’s Daily Online-People’s Daily*, Jul. 25, 2019. (中華人民共和國國務院新聞辦公室，〈新時代的中國國防〉，政府文獻刊登於人民網－人民日報，2019年07月25日)

military reforms to consolidate military powers, reform the combat systems, strengthen the navy and the air force, and establish combat capabilities of long-range projection, precision strike as well as integration of communications and intelligence.⁴⁹

For Xi Jinping himself, he has not made all these efforts for an ambition of expansion but rather for a hope to restore the “normal territory” in Chinese history. From his perspective, developing military capabilities is not for the purpose of invasion; rather, it is a strong foundation for defending China’s territory to renovate the combat capabilities of the PLA and build a modernized military power. The territory that Xi intends to defend, moreover, is the kind of territory which China once held in its glorious history in the mind of a revivalist.

IV. Xi Jinping’s Military Strategic Thinking

For Xi Jinping’s military reforms, the most important tasks include realizing the Xi’s strategies of the Chinese Dream and laying foundations for China’s future international strategies, in addition to the functions of helping to grasp to military power of the PLA and gathering power for Xi himself. The military reforms, therefore, have become a process of military enhancement with political implications. For inside China, Xi has demonstrated the images of the PLA as a modernized and professionalized military force through these reforms, so as to consolidate domestic support for the PLA, which can be the

⁴⁹ Hsiao-Huang (Stella) Shu, “US Assessment of PLA’s Development, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018’,” *Defense Situation Monthly*, Research Institute of National Defense Resources and Industry, Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, Taiwan), Sep. 7, 2018. (舒孝煌，〈美國《2018 年中國軍力報告》對解放軍發展之評估〉，國防情勢月報135期，財團法人國防安全研究院（台灣）國防資源與產業研究所，2018年9月7號）

foundation of nationalism and the core of revivalism. For outside China, through these reforms Xi has propagated PLA's integration of and preparation for sea-air joint operations and capabilities of long-range strike, an announcement to the international community that the PLA is readily capable of supporting the ideas of the Chinese Dream.⁵⁰

The Chinese Dream, as proposed by Xi, not only bears a strong sense of nationalism, which is also a collective consciousness of the Chinese nation but also manifests how Xi's thinking represents China's discontent about the international power structure, particularly that in East Asia. The Chinese Dream, therefore, includes Xi's responses to and policy guidelines about China's perception that it has not been treated or respected as it deserves in the international or East Asian community. With both domestic and external significance, the Chinese Dream involves the shaping and constructing of China's international status and impressions, as well as China's cultural influence on the world. Internally, the main features of the Chinese Dream also include an emphasis on the cohesion of the nationalist and state consciousness among the Chinese people, blending the vision of China's future and its people's expectations.⁵¹

The ideas constructed by the Chinese Dream can be seen as a logical basis for Xi's own thinking. The Strong Army Dream derived from the Chinese Dream and the military reforms to achieve the fulfill the Strong Army Dream, moreover, can provide some insight for assessing Xi's military strategic thinking.

Xi's military strategic thinking can be assessed mainly in two aspects:

⁵⁰ Guanghui Ni, "The Strong Army Dream Supports the Chinese Dream," *People's Daily Online-People's Daily*, Oct. 15, 2017. (倪光輝, 〈強軍夢護航中國夢〉, 人民網—人民日報海外版, 2017年08月01日)

⁵¹ Yu-Fen Chen, "The Establishment and Evaluation of China's National Image," *Prospect & Exploration* 13.2 (2015): 71-102. (陳郁芬, 〈中國大陸國家形象之建構與成效〉, 展望與探索, p.71-p.102, 2015年)

i.e., the military reforms on the surface and the ideology at a deeper level. The military reforms have transformed the PLA from defensive to an execution force capable of expansion and military projection. With enhanced execution energy, the PLA has become more competent to carry out the ideology within Xi's strategic thinking.⁵²

In Xi's strategic thinking, the PLA's military energy is not defined by the expansion of military force. The purpose of the PLA's expansion is not acquiring territory from other countries or destroying a regime of another country. Rather, it is because of the "intention to restore" Chinese territory that the PLA ought to be strengthened in order to defend the growing territory.⁵³

Xi's concepts about China's territory can be witnessed in many of his speeches and writings. For example, in the symposium for the leading cadres at the provincial level of the CPC, "Learning from General Secretary Xi Jinping's Important Speech, Welcoming the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," Xi provided some explications for the Chinese Dream and his own thoughts.⁵⁴ In this symposium, Xi mentioned the issues of the Chinese nation and national economy as well as his plans and principles for the development and vision of China. In this speech, two paragraphs were specifically about enriching the country, strengthening the people, and rejuvenating the nation. Here Xi made deliberate associations between the development of Chinese history and the development of the country, and such

⁵² Jin-Ping Chen, "Analysis of the Development of 'Xi Jinping's Military Strategic Thoughts,'" *Publication of Military Social Science* 16 (Mar. 2020): 5-32. (陳津萍，〈「習近平軍事戰略思想」發展之研析〉，軍事社會科學專刊，6期，P5-32，2020年03月)

⁵³ Yong-He Zhong, *Decoding the Strategies of the "Marine Power": The Rights Protection and Law Enforcement of the Navy of the People's Liberation Army*, Taipei: Sea Hunter [Lie Hai Ren], Aug. 17, 2018. (鍾永和〈解密「海洋強國」戰略：解放軍海軍維權與執法〉，獵海人出版社，2018年08月17日)

⁵⁴ Zhimin Yan, "Striving to Fulfill the Chinese Dream from a New Historical Starting Point," *People Daily Online-People's Daily*, Oct. 18, 2017. (閻志民，〈從新的歷史起點出發奮力實現中國夢〉，人民網－人民日報，2017年10月18日)

associations can be taken as the crucial core of the Chinese Dream and Xi's thinking.

Regarding the “prosperous country and strong people,” Xi stated that “After nearly 40 years of development in reforms and opening up, our country has become an economic power in the world ... Looking back at history, the economic aggregate was once tremendous in Qing Dynasty, which was nonetheless defeated by western countries who had much smaller economic aggregate. This is a historical lesson that being big is not the same as being strong ...”

About rejuvenating the Chinese nation, then, Xi said that “The Chinese nation has a history of more than 5,000 years of civilization and has created a splendid Chinese civilization. For thousands of years, Chinese civilization has long been at the forefront of the world and has made major contributions to the development of human civilization. In modern times, however, the Chinese civilization has gradually fallen behind, and the Chinese nation has been invaded and oppressed by imperialists.... The Chinese civilization is also increasingly rejuvenated, and its influence on the world has become greater. Still, there is a gap between now and China in history in terms of status and influence in the world. In order to achieve the great cause of national rejuvenation and recast the glory of Chinese civilization, we still need to make great efforts.”⁵⁵

From these two paragraphs, it is evident that Xi's thinking originates from a sentiment of Chinese nation, as well as an illusory hope of the strength and prosperity of the Qing Empire. This is also a mentality that keeps holding grudge on the history of the imperialist invasion of the Qing Empire and the weakening of the Chinese nation from then on. What Xi intends to rebuild, therefore, is the prosperity and strength of China at the time of the Qing Empire.

⁵⁵ “Instructions in Keywords: Xi Jinping's Important Speech on July 26,” *Xinhua News Online*, Aug. 1, 2017. (新华网，〈关键词指示习近平“7·26”重要讲话内容〉，2017年08月01日）

The main point of Xi's strategic thinking, therefore, is to "retore" the territory of Qing Empire and the power and prosperity of the Chinese nation, which motivated Xi to launch a series of reforms. Facing the international community and neighboring countries, Xi defines China, with the Chinese Dream, as a country that develops peaceful revival. As to the military operations of the PLA, he also defines those as for the purpose of retrieving China's lost land but not invading; the strengthening of the PLA is for the security of China's territory instead of the rise of a military power.⁵⁶

In Xi's strategic thinking, the demands on the PLA's capabilities of overseas strike accord with the hopes of the Chinese Dream to retake and safeguard the territories which China has lost, and which are currently outside China's borders. As this is a task that should be performed by the PLA, the PLA will gradually develop its military power overseas, with a focus on the traditional territory that used to belong to the Qing Empire. In addition to defending the vanity about history, such a task is also based on an intention to redress the shame that the Chinese have felt.⁵⁷

V. Conclusion

In Xi Jinping's philosophy of governance, the Chinese Dream is the goal of national development and vision. Under the Chinese nationalism, national dignity is an ideal superior to all, and the Chinese Dream combines national sentiments and reactions. China is currently transforming from a country of nationalism and party-stateism to a revivalist country. As revivalist countries

⁵⁶ Lang Kao, "How to Perceive the Rise of China?" *Prospect Quarterly* 7.2 (Apr. 2006): 53-94. (高朗, 〈如何理解中國崛起?〉, 遠景基金會季刊第七卷第二期, 2006年4月)

⁵⁷ "Rong Leng: What Is the Chinese Dream and How to Understand It," *People's Daily Online-People's Daily*, Apr. 26, 2013. (人民網—人民日報, 〈冷溶：什麼是中國夢，怎樣理解中國夢〉, 2013年04月26日)

once experienced glories but then declined, people and governments of such countries cherish the historical past and strive to restore their countries to an ideal state.

Based on the above analysis, while the Chinese Dream is said to be the goal of national development, the real meaning is actually the Strong Army Dream. Close examinations of Xi's strategic thinking and China's military development reveal that the Chinese Dream, in fact, can be described as a clever façade which Xi employs as his political maneuver. With revivalism led by the "Chinese Dream" slogan, all such campaigns as uniting the people within the country, eliminating the opposition in the party, reorganizing the powers of the PLA, strengthening the combat capabilities, enhancing the military power, and so on, can be summarily explained to the international community with the rhetoric of the Chinese Dream.

An important characteristic of Xi's strategic is the reorganizing and substantial grasping of power. As to the impacts of the military reforms on the domestic political power structure, the previous power structure in the PLA was refined, fragmented, and then replaced by a new power structure, which eventually ended up with powers being gathered back to the Central Military Commission (CMC). On the surface, the process may appear to be a shattering of the military chain of command and a separation of power. Through the separated military power, in fact, the various powers came under control of the CMC, which means Xi, as the Chairman of the CMC, has come to hold the military power. In this way, the PLA's influences on the stability of China have been largely decreased; the PLA has transformed from an influencer of the CPC regime to an armed force exclusively belonging to the CPC.

As to the impacts of Xi's military reforms on the international power structure, on the other hand, the PLA has not only undergone changes of power but also enhanced its overseas capabilities. With strengthened navy and air force, Xi has now started to challenge the existing international power balance.

The PLA has started to intervene in regional stability and challenge traditional forces of the region. Such interventions, moreover, have increased China's influence in various regions and made it easier for China to hold control over the region.

In all these processes of challenging and reorganizing the existing power structure, the consequent conflicts and damages did not sway Xi's determination to carry out these campaigns. As power conflicts and division lead to new balance and power structure, the key concern in Xi's strategic thinking is how to eventually hold substantial control over the power.

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從性平教育觀點析論青世代感情觀

黃淑鈴^{*}

摘要

本研究從性平教育觀點探討青少年受多元文化教育，影響自我到超我的情感關係。

近觀全球面臨少子女化、高齡化世代不均險境，家庭傳統教育隨性平教育、家庭暴力防治推動，現家庭關係不再從一而終、男性不再權威、多元性別、愛情感官化、直觀的兩性衝突與論公平的性別主流化。高等法院資料中顯示中年婚離婚對數激增多於青少年，還有台灣目睹暴力兒童與大陸留童照顧問題，皆來自婚姻衝突與經濟困境問題。因此，本研究假設一、新世代恐婚、不孕受影響因素與目睹暴力有關。假設二中高齡重視自我不再壓抑，離婚率提升與性平教育有關。

研究中發現，青年感情受父母婚姻影響甚深。傳統婚姻倫理綱常是穩定婚姻制度與家庭教育傳承動力，然都市居住型態與移居形成世界地球村，自然法則生理需求驅動青少年進入婚姻、組織家庭；不受家庭暴力法與性平主張而影響對婚姻渴望。

透過問卷樣本分析，主要對象為台灣與北京兩岸22歲大學生，共回收200份有效樣本。從訪談資料中呈現青世代婚姻與感情等價值觀與性平教育關係，研究者蒐集兩岸社會樣態資料中看見，新世紀兩性親密關係以友伴、同居方式取代婚姻關係的選擇，現代化城市族群蜗居、蟻居、多元文化移民婚姻。其次，目睹家庭暴力的家庭教育與青少年的感情觀有相關。青少年處於多元文化新社會，更需要調適感情與目睹衝突經驗關係，默默

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接收童年目睹婚暴變異，轉換成超我的感情觀。

關鍵詞：家庭暴力防治、目睹衝突、性別平等

An analysis of the young generation's emotional from the perspective of gender equality education

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Abstract

This study object to explores the impact of multicultural education on youth emotional relationships from the ego to the superego from the perspective of gender equality education.

From World environment, Traditional family education has been promoted along with gender equality education and domestic violence prevention. Now, family relationships are no longer consistent, men are no longer authoritative, gender is diverse, and love is sensual intuitive gender conflict and gender mainstreaming on fairness. Hypothesis 1: This study is that factors affecting the new generation's fear of marriage and infertility are related to witnessing violence. Hypothesis 2: The elderly in middle school value themselves and no longer suppress themselves, and the increase in divorce rate is related to gender equality education.

The samples analyzed in this study were 22-year-old college students from Taiwan and Beijing, and a total of 200 valid samples were recovered. From the relationship between the young generation's values such as marriage and relationships and gender equality education was revealed. The researchers collected data on social patterns on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and saw that in the new century, intimate relationships between the sexes have replaced the

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choice of marriage with companionship and cohabitation, and modern urban groups live in seclusion. , Ant Habitat , and Multicultural Immigrant Marriage .

Secondly, Family education of witnessing domestic violence is related to adolescents' emotional outlook. In a new multicultural society, teenagers need to adjust their relationship with the experience of witnessing conflicts, silently accept the mutation of witnessing marital violence in childhood and change superego view of emotions.

Keywords: Domestic Violence Prevention, Witnessed Conflict, Gender Equality

壹、前言

儒家文化傳統婚姻講究門當戶對，考量政治、經濟、傳宗接代及家庭照顧等因素，父權制度與階級制度如社會控制雙鉗，掐住婚姻從單軌變多軌，無條件接受納妾或主張廢止或轉送、轉賣。本研究從1979年聯合國大會通過CEDAW公約法，主張兩性平權、性平教育，主張優先消除刻板印象與歧視。至2015年發佈《改變我們的世界：2030年永續發展議程》中公布永續發展SDGS17項目標。我國更制定家庭暴力三法，保護家庭內弱勢，扭轉家庭內權力不對稱行為；然暴力事件向家外發展，引發研究者亟欲揭開暴力因子潛藏於兒童，且影響其情感觀。

研究者觀察近代中西方的婚姻觀思想差異，以情、理、法為準則。於法制面，兩性情感在西方個人主義認為婚姻是男女間的契約關係，愛情屬個人私事，立婚前協議契約盛行；東方基於家庭倫理傳統認為婚姻視為家庭，是公共性具有法制性保障契約。於理智面，現代婚姻制度指陳「個性不合」即可提出離婚申請，婚姻關係暴力零容忍，「子代」目睹「父母代」壓抑隱忍。於情感面，青少年即欲擺脫「依附」關係、婚姻的束縛與青貧現象，創新全球化多元文化與多元化伴侶型態，不婚、同居或伴侶關係讓婚姻不再是組織家庭唯一途徑。

貳、感情觀傳統到現代的過渡

現在社會兩性選擇不婚或同居不在少數，少子女化、高齡化與M型社會讓婚姻發展更艱鉅。又性別平等、反暴力的意識，主為消除女性遭受歧視環境與權力不對稱而起，現代化女性對婚姻期待不再「奉子成婚」或「男高女低」依附；又少子女化的社會對於傳統大家庭的生活無法體會，婚姻中除了孝敬對方家庭雙親，還附加「蕃薯藤」似的親戚族人的倫理議題。獨身子女多了平等、自主，兩性合婚個人與家庭生活文化經驗差異，

都是現代化擺脫傳統需面對的變革。

研究者從理性與感情看婚姻倫理，「倫」重在分別如父子、遠近與親疏，五倫「天、地、君、親、師」，倫理價值反映出階層觀念，倫理因血緣關係、主雇關係與師徒關係，本具階層意識。道德每一個判斷都需要一個價值準繩做基礎，依倫理制定將婚姻關係法制化，乃是為穩定社會發展的控制工具，期望感性的婚姻生活建立在理性的婚姻契約上，維繫兩情相悅維持永恆親密關係。

楊文山教授在台灣未來婚姻趨勢研究中認為婚姻不再是青年優勢選擇，早期進入婚姻的選擇效果比較重要，比較健康快樂的人較易進入婚姻享受婚姻帶來的效益。但這與現行家庭與學校教育有顯見衝突，現況「大學」畢業為兩岸基礎學歷，父母擔心輸在起跑點、學校禁止談戀愛、擔心心智未成熟未成年懷孕，家庭教育與學校教育口徑一致「沒學歷、沒前途」。高功能家庭與失功能家庭「我要離家才有前途」，青春期青年心理、行為發展問題，反暴力前端工作不只在適婚或屆齡，而是需要在國中小補救愛的道德觀。

一、傳統與現代婚姻過渡與轉銜

婚姻的倫理道德，面臨拋棄式愛情盛行與多段婚姻經驗的物慾社會挑戰，要如何管理現代化婚姻觀青年、青壯年與成年人外遇問題為婚姻出軌，違反法定一夫一妻制婚姻法規範？。新加坡於2006年成立婚姻中心協助婚姻諮商輔導，台灣教育部於2007年規劃婚姻三部曲培養適婚男女正確婚姻觀。大陸以全國婦聯與大陸教育協會在各地開辦家庭教育。在個人層面兩岸興起婚姻心理諮商與親子教育活動，過去毛澤東時代大陸為跨進現代化拋棄儒家思想主張「破四舊」，隨開放政策開始重視孔孟學說訴求倫理與道德。

國內學者張春興（1994）認為問題根植於家庭，病象顯現於學校，病情惡化於社會。陳毓文（2010）於研究中發現，少年各種問題行為往往都與家庭失功能有關，當父母親關係不和諧發生衝突無暇顧及子女需求，

可能學習暴力解決因應模式與發展暴力行為的可能性。台灣內政部統計處2015年6月公報，國內離婚年增率15年來0.52%，近10年（93年至103年）來離婚對數之婚齡結構，婚齡未滿5年離婚者比重降低6.27個百分點，而婚齡10年以上離婚者所占比率增加6.30個百分點，結構變化頗為明顯，主要係中外聯姻離婚對數之結婚年數逐年向後遞延所致（婚齡未滿5年離婚者由93年之85.30%減少至103年之27.72%、婚齡10年以上離婚者則由3.34%增加至41.90%）¹

大陸民政部2015年發佈2014年社會服務發展統計公報，大陸離婚率已連續12年逐年遞增，從2010年267萬8000對增加到363萬7000對。北京、上海市離婚最多的城市，北京市民政局指出，閃婚、閃離現象頻繁，以海淀、朝陽區為最。²

自由人權與家庭暴力保護政策主張親密關係中不容許暴力、高壓控管行為，反暴力這是現代化、自由社會必然性的發展，反暴力行動起於經濟安全，自由主義為人權走上街頭，激進倡議國家要政策制定以控制社會不安全。從理性面，青少年經由學校教育與家庭教育認識親密關係暴力，體認個體身體自主權反對權控與霸凌，家庭暴力、性侵、性騷三法懲處企圖傷害他人自由的相對人；需求理論面，為獲得生存需求要有能力表達尋求愛與隸屬，尋求自尊方能推向自我實踐。

我思青少年的婚姻行為來自家庭教育，家庭是青少年為學習的基礎，現代化家庭不因有婚姻才能組成家庭，如不婚生子或離婚與原生父母或子女同住即為家庭。自由流動人口匯集於城市網路速度的社會象徵「快速」，加諸青年不耐煩父母傳統對暴力「隱忍」行為，不再同意有暴力的親密關係，不再以婚姻為唯一途徑自組超現代化「單親家庭」、「同性家庭」、「多國混血家庭」等。

¹ 台灣內政部統計通報2015年第24周台灣離婚對數狀況分析<http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/week/201508>。

² 中共民政部2015年發佈2014年社會服務發展統計公報。下載於<http://www.mca.gov.cn/201506>

二、多元族群與婚姻態樣

婚姻仲介業取代傳統「媒婆」在本世紀成為專職服務業，受資本主義影響，速食文化與網際網路快速生活的步調，世界地球村的概念成為全球化生活新象徵，跨域、跨境婚姻也成為全球化的新家庭組合。加諸東南亞國家移工經濟政策，截至2015年讓台灣多了近50萬人口，以婚姻移入台灣落地生根與生育子女，台灣社會呈現多元種族、多元文化新態樣，原住民14族、客家族群再加上新住民，婚姻市場充斥不同語言與生活文化。

大陸農村人口嚴重外流與求職跨域問題，跨區、跨域後定居；台灣跨國境移民婚配。無論跨域、跨境結婚都為滿足就業、經濟需求，透過媒介台灣、香港、澳門、新加坡與大陸語言、文化背景相通，許多男性錯估自己與配偶間有極大文化與生活差異，移工轉移婚跨國或跨境婚姻，婚姻欠缺戀愛與理性基礎，移婚配偶遭受語言溝通困境與不友善生活境遇，離婚多於本國婚姻，也讓跨國婚姻被蒙上「三高」成本高、衝突高、離婚高。

研究者在這裡所謂「成本高」非成親成本，過往採儀式婚現已為登記婚，宴客儀式漸趨簡單化；是婚後家庭不平、婚姻調適成本。進入婚姻後以性愛關係開始培養感情，被動生活學習與倫理、孝道及家和萬事興等意識教育，新來乍到語言不通形成依附關係，支配取代互動平等生活模式，移民生存境遇漸落入暴力操控循環。語言與就業能力讓新住民婚姻不平，耗費於情感建立與弭平文化衝突成本高。

「衝突高」，當經濟起飛農村與城市界限變得模糊，人口高密度集中於城市，親密關係衝突耗損兩性對婚姻的期待，與組成家庭的吸引力；諸多外遇問題引發拋家、棄子、情殺等社會重大危機事件。

「離婚高」，根據台灣內政部2012年統計資料，全年離婚達55,980對，平均每四對離婚即有一對為跨海婚姻。依1998年台灣地區社會發展趨勢調查顯示，女性91.2%承擔家務勞動比例高於男性6.9%，尚有親自照顧幼兒比例，3歲以下以自己照顧為主；受照顧烙印影響「貧窮女性化」更讓女性單親家庭蒙上低收入、低成就而落入貧窮線，更因子女教育資源不足或失功能家庭，成社會安全網破綻的潛在因素。

語言隔閡與經濟弱勢遭家族與社會排除，跨國婚姻暴力、控制造成婚姻離異問題，如單親、繼親、隔代教養、監護權或財產繼承等家庭變項議題。多元文化的社會充斥單親家庭養育子女的問題，其遭遇無法與獨身子女問題等同視之。蓋因單親家庭因教育、扶養與照顧能量不足，相關社會問題如少年犯罪、婚姻暴力、兒童虐待、精障、老人虐待、遊民、自殺與兒童中輟等都與單親家庭有絕對性相關。獨身子女過渡寵愛與目睹父母婚姻衝突，感情依附觀自我概念統合、分化問題；如內向性行為、愛現競爭、孤獨壓力、痛覺隔離傾向等行為。

兩者差異與家庭暴力防治政策關係在於傳統為婚姻內教養問題，暴力手段複製與公民意識提升，讓隱忍的情緒不再壓抑，少了寬容與捨得道德學習，讓多元化單親家庭成為新世代社會組成基礎。

小結，從兩性平等、性別主流化到「CEDAW」消除一切形式歧視等，就性別角色意識型態訴求平等，解構婚姻內權力與控制，重構平權愛情與婚姻。社會集體反家庭暴力催生立法，凸顯家庭內與非婚姻關係性暴力，不再是因婚姻制度或因性關係即擁有對方身、心、靈，取代的是尊重個體自由意志，理性看待婚姻親密關係與家事分工。對應之策，終結暴力不僅要將其趕出婚姻逐出家門，更要將其逐出社會與人際互動間吼叫、謾罵、詆毀、攻擊的衝突行為；自由社會需要經常自我檢視與敏於覺察，揪出隱藏在潛意識的暴力因子。面對個體自我分化、統合概念與家庭溝通協調功能；第一步行為教育從小做起，倡議兩性平等的基礎教育，將性別平等嵌入通識教育，依照兩岸參與1995年世界婦女行動宣言，同步行動為弱勢婦女發聲人人都享有自由平等、尊嚴與權利。

參、婚姻與經濟

家庭暴力進入立法緣起於上層結構基礎來自系層結構「經濟」，引元稹《遣悲懷》「貧賤夫妻百事哀」，更見證婚姻與經濟有絕對與必要關係。研究者從馬克思價值理論論述「婚姻」在經濟市場的價值，馬克思

認為商品具有使用價值（Gebrauchswert）與交換價值（Tauschwert）雙重性，任何社會不能停止消費與停止生產，從傳承與不斷更新的事實也就是「再生產」。因此人口增生讓社會不斷演進，透過婚姻消費與生產，是社會兩個主要經濟活動力；隨著工業化與現代化婚姻發展趨勢，社會受自由主義影響女性自由擇婚與就業，消除女性「貧窮化」的刻板印象。女性在婚姻內「再生產」價值被女性主義者拿出來探討「家庭勞務有給職」，伸張在家庭勞動服務功能。

挑戰一，「婚姻成本」。從研究資料彙整中呈現，當國家經濟發展國民平均所得增加，兩岸在台灣經濟奇蹟與大陸經濟崛起後，滿足收活需求後朝向愛與隸屬階段，追求自我實踐充分表達自我感受。婚姻生活為滿足物慾的挑戰，社會普遍性的消費行為，與銀行刷卡借貸、養債做為現代化理財的習慣，家庭消費與照顧費分攤等「婚姻經營成本」，亦是婚姻衝突成因。其二有感婚姻暴力成因，來自家務角色分工，為國家競爭力與創造婦女二度就業機會，母職的家庭勞務分工問題與子女教養問題，成了婚姻關係中需要運用協商調節機制。

挑戰二，青貧與城市集中化。自大陸採經濟開放政策，經濟起飛十年大躍進，導致農村青壯年向外發展，期中策略大陸以獎勵措施誘發資本家朝內陸發展；就業人潮湧進新開發區域。從區域性經濟發展創造青壯年進城就業或創業，工業化創造青壯年就業新契機，夫妻前往城市拚經濟造成村落老人與留守兒童互助生存之代間社會樣態。從田野觀察大陸現況社會問題分三塊「速食婚姻」、「高齡化村落」及「留守兒童」，社區居委調解僅能協助循舊制傳統「街坊」衝突與矛盾，無法以調解途徑，預防或救援「速食婚姻」與「約會暴力」等攻擊性親密關係暴力行為。

挑戰三，農村城市化。新群聚「高樓大廈」社區型態與舊社區「巷弄」型態文化銜接的缺口(gap)。這高密度經濟開發引發社會快速朝現代化變遷的新象徵。最後，青年面臨教育費擴張與學歷文憑貶值，因就學延後結婚、因就業延後生育。如就業派遣制取代正式聘僱消費青年剩餘價值與再生產；當需求被刺激，消費就越擴大，青年普遍遭遇網際網路的過度消費問題。讓青年延緩婚育，新貧擴大、性別不平、世代不公。

肆、網路與家庭情感教育

跨域、跨國網路交友，滿足青年網速的速度感，為求生存資源大量青年、成年人隨經濟流往城市集中，有別於傳統竹圍小社區公廟、宗親、農村組織，取而代之的是非政府組織的社區中心與管理委員會。新社區文化需要政府與非營利組織建置社區管理辦法，截至今日尚未見約束性反暴力「基模」，如因此成年人的感情衝突、人身安全、閃離情殺與非自主性性侵議題，親密關係暴力社區「性暴力」造成社區不安全。資訊散布就在分秒間，兩岸青世代勇衝敢現、擺脫傳統束縛的行為，「網軍」、「部落客」結網拉關係、集體批判，成為「青世代」社會象徵。受多元文化刺激與自由主義影響，倡議自由、反壓迫、反暴力，台灣大學生攻佔立法院、教育部；大陸「大陸好聲音」透露青年追星奔向自由渴望，及北京女大學生在街頭舉牌訴求性別平等行動。

婚姻循世界經濟發展脈動，婚姻所需成本無法再受傳統約束，簡化流程採登記制取代儀式婚，獨生子女缺乏家庭倫理約束與學習兩家姻親關係維繫學習，語言暴力衝突演變為肢體暴力又成為暴力代間傳遞影響下一代生活。家庭暴力防治政策從家庭衝突中介入，干預家庭影響公共安全，保護弱勢的過程是正義，多元文化婚姻與家庭來自族群傳統文化建置，透過網路橫向將多元文化串成全球化，影響新世代婚姻觀有相關。

伍、結語

本研究探討青少年感情觀受性平教育影響，從法治、理性與情感三面向，次從社會「有感」家庭暴力到展現正義「立法」階段，文件分析脈絡從比較家庭暴力與情感關聯性。描述婚姻或非婚姻親密關係暴力發生與社會連帶，透過訪談青少年感情觀，影響婚姻途徑的擇取。

研究發現「現代婚姻」不再經由婚姻制度約束性愛權，自由配偶的選

擇，組合關係建構在性愛、婚姻與生育三件事。研究者為勾勒出新世紀婚姻多元化的圖像，透過性別平等課堂上，隨機詢問參與課程已婚40歲以上婦女，如再有一次擇偶機會是否會選擇婚姻，60%婦女不考慮結婚，選擇同居或友伴關係。在研究問卷回收中，兩岸青少年表達情感與婚姻的選擇為最有二：「應父母要求、幸好父母沒離婚否則影響她的婚姻」、「受早期童年經驗影響甚深」。

真實反映青年對感情抉擇，來自雙親的相處學習與期待。但多數婦女仍認同結婚是穩定家庭與情感的作法；這與青少年問卷回饋有一致性的看法，多數青年認同婚姻制度視穩定情感的工具，這與父母對子女婚姻的期待有關。從本研究資料分心中得見世代衝突來自學校與家庭教育是兩條平行線，青少年從小接受性別平等知識教育與獨生子女家庭教育，婚姻觀受父母的婚姻觀影響，感情觀受父母、同儕與媒體影響。

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從司法院看臺灣同性合法化媒體報導 及其輿論影響之個案研究

雍旻^{*}

摘要

司法院下轄臺灣各級法院，在形成和發展臺灣法律體系方面發揮了關鍵作用。它通過司法裁決不斷引發社會變革，通過司法決定顯著重構了社會框架。臺灣作為亞洲第一個合法化同性婚姻的地區而聞名，隨著臺灣社會地位的巨大變化，公眾對司法決定和同性婚姻的看法也發生了很大變化。本文試圖探討同性婚姻和公眾看法對這個多方複雜的領域，旨在釐清本文的研究問題：「臺灣最高法院合法化同性婚姻的決定如何影響公眾對同性婚姻的態度？」

2017年同性婚姻合法化的辯論開始引人注目，當時司法院發佈第748號司法解釋，裁定任何禁止或限制同性婚姻的規定都是違憲的。最高法院給予臺灣立法機構兩年時間將司法解釋制定為法律；法院的決定根本改變了數百年來的傳統和規範，預料中地引發了社會反彈，但也開啟了臺灣追求婚姻平等的征程。儘管取得了如此成功，合法化的旅程並不是沒有挑戰的。在發佈第748號司法院解釋後，同性婚姻有效性問題在2018年面臨了兩次全民公投。這些全民公投通過明顯限制了同性結合的權利，禁止了對臺灣民法本來計畫的修改。因此，儘管正式獲得承認，同性伴侶比異性伴侶獲得的政府福利要少得多。

最終，臺灣合法化同性婚姻面臨著巨大的制約，因為公眾輿論普遍不支持。因此，本研究的目的是在以媒體呈現作為反映公眾意見的平臺的基

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礎上，擴展以往的研究，並建立對同性婚姻合法化對公眾意見影響的新理解。

關鍵字：司法判決、同性合法化、社會輿論

Judicial Yuan: A Case Study on Media Representations of Same-Sex Legalization and Its Impact on Public Opinion in Taiwan

Ari Min Yong^{*}

Introduction

The Supreme Court of Taiwan, also referred to as the Judicial Yuan, serves a pivotal function in the formation and evolution of Taiwanese jurisprudence. As such, it constantly instigates social transformations that significantly restructure the nation's societal framework through judicial decisions. Renowned as the first Asian nation to legalize same-sex marriage, Taiwan's ruling was an extremely publicized case that cemented its status as a prominent liberal power in reforming traditional social norms (Chang, 2020). Along with the dramatic shift in Taiwan's social position, public opinion towards the judicial decision and same-sex marriage has also been greatly altered. This essay delves into the multifaceted and intricate domain of same-sex marriage and public perception, seeking to address the research question: "How has the Taiwanese Supreme Court's decision to legalize same-sex marriage influenced the public attitude toward same-sex marriage?"²

The debate on the legalization of same-sex marriage gained prominence in 2017 when Judicial Yuan released judicial interpretation No. 748, ruling that any bans or restrictions on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional (Chen, 2019). The Supreme Court gave the federal legislature two years to fully enact

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the judicial interpretation into law. The court's decision to fundamentally change centuries-old traditions and norms was met with expected social backlash; however, it also triggered the beginning of Taiwan's journey to marital equality (Chen, 2019). While 2017 marked a pivotal milestone in the official legalization of same-sex marriage, proponents of same-sex marriage and civil rights societies had been advocating for the legalization of same-sex marriage long before the ruling.

Taiwan's eventual success in becoming the first Asian nation to legalize same-sex marriage can be attributed to a number of reasons, namely the general support from the public, the many progressive politicians in office, and the seven liberal justices appointed by Tsai Ing-Wen (the president of the Republic of China) in 2016 (Chang, 2020). Despite such success, the journey to legalization was not devoid of challenges. Following the release of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748, the issue of same-sex marriage validity faced two national referendums in 2018 (Yang, 2021). Such referendums significantly restricted the rights of same-sex unions by prohibiting the originally intended amendments to the Taiwan civil code. As a result, despite the official recognition, same-sex couples received significantly fewer government benefits than heterosexual couples. Ultimately, despite the tenacity of notable civil rights leaders and politicians advocating for marital equality, Taiwan's legalization of same-sex marriage faced monumental restrictions due to the largely negative public opinion.

With public attitude holding a crucial position in the social sphere, understanding and contributing to a theory that encapsulates the correlation between judicial law and public opinion will enlarge the understanding of the relationship between law and society. Thus, the purpose of this study will be to expand on prior studies and establish a novel understanding of the impact of same-sex marriage legalization on public opinion using media representation as the platform to reflect public opinion.

Literature Review

Social Trends and Theories

In the existing research, numerous attempts have been made to uncover social theories and trends through analysis of public opinion within the scope of the legalization of same-sex marriage. Content analysis serves as the primary method employed by researchers in this field since the presence, meanings, and relationships among specific words, themes, or concepts are emphasized. Yu-Te Huang's study, published in 2020, sought to determine the well-being of young LGB adults before and after the legalization of same-sex marriage so as to evaluate the impact of the legalization and theorize the corresponding implications (Huang, 2020). In the study, narrative research was adopted, involving a broad methodology consisting of content analysis and surveys. The research was conducted using both survey sampling, which highlights individuals' personal experiences, and content analysis of policies, literature, and social theories. The findings revealed that the trend of support for same-sex marriage increased slightly; however, opposition simultaneously intensified as a consequence of the legalization of same-sex marriage. Various theories related to legalization and mental well-being were compared to form a rational conclusion on the social trends or theories that would encapsulate the situation in Taiwan. Huang found that the impact of judicial law in Taiwan was different from pre-existing theories proposed by Western researchers under the context of Taiwan's legalization of same-sex marriage. Thus, the research revealed a trend wherein heightened publicity of the legalization of same-sex marriage led to an increase in both proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage.

Roles Political and Social Institutions Play

The legalization of same-sex marriage and its corresponding public opinion can also be attributed to various institutions that aided this movement. It is common for researchers to seek the identification of political and social institutions in order to gain an understanding of public opinion through content analysis. One example is a study conducted by Timothy S. Rich which revealed that the same-sex marriage debate in Taiwan was discussed in connection with the 2020 presidential election. A mixed study primarily consisting of content analysis was adopted, in which original survey data, pre-existing bodies of literature, and the recorded results of the 2020 election were examined (Rich, 2020). The findings implied that opinions on same-sex marriage were malleable to a certain extent, and the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) success in advocating for legalization may lead to further LGBT rights, opening Taiwan to the possibility of more liberal social reforms. Corroborating such findings, Doris T. Chang, in another study, analyzed social presence through research into NGO websites, newspapers, and academic journals to uncover the different roles social and political institutions play in the expansion of same-sex marital rights. In another study, Chang explained how the government and legislatures played a pivotal role in expanding such rights; however, this only transpired due to support from NGOs and local public opinion since the government and legislators merely represent their constituents and interest groups (Chang, 2020). Both studies provided an additional perspective on how different organizations fought for equal marital rights despite having different methodologies. While Huang's study emphasized the correlation between legalization and public opinion, Chang's study uncovered the reasons and causation of the expansion of marital equality.

In an effort to understand the role of various institutions, social media plays a significant role in reflecting the sentiment of the public as well as

driving social change. Through content analysis of various liberal movements in Taiwan, Jyun-Jie Yang's study in 2021 capitalized on this trend by focusing on Taiwan's compressed modernity of the legalization of same-sex marriage (Yang, 2021). Yang performed content analysis on various social sources that would reflect the Taiwanese public attitude. Yang analyzed posts on the fan pages of Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan by searching for various keywords and terminology related to homosexuality. The research concluded that these urgent mobilizations employed social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and LINE in a concentrated manner to disseminate *tongzhi* activist energy to the general public within the context of advocating for same-sex marriage legalization. The research qualitatively revealed how people advocated for the legalization of same-sex marriage by using social media and other media platforms to express their opinions and advocacies for same-sex marital rights, thereby contributing to the legalization of same-sex marriage. Chao-Ju Chen, in a separate study, expanded further in asserting that proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage play almost equal roles in the expansion of same-sex marital rights (Chen, 2019). Chen explained that, just as proponents of same-sex marriage rights expressed their views to promote LGBTQ rights, opponents also voiced their opinions to restrict such rights. This ultimately led to the referendums that significantly curtailed the impact of the judicial decision. Chen's study largely expanded on Huang's study to reveal additional information on how opponents of same-sex unions contributed to the current status in Taiwan. However, Chen's study also shows a significant conflict between different sources because it asserts that negative viewpoints are equally as prevalent as positive viewpoints, while Yang's study argues that positive perceptions outweigh negative ones. This debate opens up the gap in research in this field because the results differ depending on methodology and study.

Effects of The Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage

The quantitative effects of legalizing same-sex marriage have been the subject of numerous studies, particularly in respect of the shifts in public opinion. Content analysis is a robust commonality in all of these studies, as it effectively identifies crucial data points and enables insightful analysis of these data points. Hsiu-Chin Yang conducted a study in 2021 on the shift in cultural perspective under the context of legalizing same-sex marriage. The study used content analysis to find qualitative data on the subject by collecting and analyzing data (Yang, 2021). The research compared insights from newspapers, magazines, and journals to evaluate the evolution and development of same-sex marriage legalization within a cultural framework. The research compared insights from newspapers, magazines, and journals to evaluate the changes and developments of same-sex legalization within a cultural framework. This approach can enable the identification of societal tendencies and social consciousness toward same-sex marriage legalization. The findings revealed that prior to legalization, Taiwan's cultural perception of homosexuality was generally negative, with many viewing it as shameful and sick. Such perception caused many LGBT individuals to develop mental illnesses as a result. Following the legalization of same-sex marriage in Taiwan, the majority of people accepted the right of LGBT individuals to marry. Presently, the majority of Taiwanese people consider same-sex marriage as a normal means of forming families. The research concluded that there is a clear positive correlation between tolerance and the legalization of same-sex marriage, which clashes with findings in other research. However, Frederic Krumbein further extended Yang's argument by introducing additional insight focusing on the general public, asserting that the rationale behind legalizing same-sex marriage through judicial law was connected to the concept of democracy. This means that the public attitude toward LGBT couples was a driving force that contributed

to the legalization (Krumbein, 2020). Krumbein's study strengthened the positive correlation between legalization and public opinion through a different viewpoint. Simultaneously, both of these research also conflict with the results of the national referendums in 2018, where opponents of same-sex marriage clearly outweighed proponents, further highlighting a gap in research.

The shift in public perception has been studied by numerous researchers in various ways, each producing slightly different results. Through content analysis on Taiwanese Internet News, Yu-Chaing Chen sought to investigate social attitudes toward homosexuality (Chen, 2018). In the study, data were gathered from four news sources, sorted into several semantic categories, and then contextually examined. The analysis of labels for gays and lesbians, including the use of terms like *tongzhi*, is a crucial aspect of data collection aimed at selecting the most successful research keywords. The research revealed that the term *tongzhi* appeared 78,800,000 times when searching Google (the most frequently used search engine on the World Wide Web). Chen explains how *tongzhi* is often too formal and academic. This view was supported by citing an interview where he discovered that *tongzhi* is a word used to refer to sexual minorities in general at a superordinate level. The study delved into numerous terminologies to ultimately conclude how positive opinions surpass negative opinions on homosexuality in Taiwan Internet News. By utilizing quantitative content analysis as the methodology to analyze public opinion's tolerance of gay marriage between 2000 to 2016, Ching-Teng Chiu expanded on Chen's results (Chiu, 2019). Chiu investigated prominent news sources to identify trends and themes between positive and negative opinions on gay marriage, gathering quantitative data to form general conclusions on people's tolerance towards gay marriage. Chiu utilized a corpus manager and text analysis software to categorize keywords, phrases, and themes to form a general assumption on the positivity or negativity of public opinion at a specific point in time, depending on the publication of the news. Through the analysis, a conclusion

was drawn that between 2000 to 2016, negative words were used far more often than positive words; however, the news media has generally shown support for same-sex marriage overall, particularly in more recent years. Opinions were also found to be mixed from 2003 to 2008; however, proponents of same-sex marriage have clearly outnumbered opponents since 2009. This finding further reveals the gap in research where multiple sources would conclude with conflicting findings. Although there is no definitive answer as to precisely when or how proponents of same-sex marriage became more prevalent, the content analysis still serves as a powerful methodology for finding a general perspective on social trends. Quantitative research is more beneficial for obtaining more general data on a large area of analysis, while qualitative research focuses on a more specific result with a smaller pool of people.

Direction of Study

The primary focus of this study is to examine the correlation between constitutional law and social attitude under the context of the highly publicized case of the legalization of same-sex marriage in Taiwan. As such, a research question that encapsulates these crucial concepts was formulated as follows: “How has the Taiwanese Supreme Court's decision to legalize same-sex marriage influenced the public attitude toward same-sex marriage?” The main objective of this paper is to find common ground between previous literature and establish a complementary perspective to understand whether public attitude was more positive or negative. Because previous research found contrasting conclusions on this issue, this paper will take a different approach to potentially find a definitive answer.

The debate over same-sex marriage has been a prominent social issue in Taiwanese society. Through analysis of the increase in media representation of a particular issue and its corresponding effects on public opinion, this field

of research will be advanced, thereby providing additional insights beyond the findings of existing literature. As such, the purpose of this study is to reduce this gap in research by using media representation as the main platform to reflect the correlation between the judicial ruling and public opinion, which previous sources have not analyzed before.

Content Analysis

Since the aim of the research is to identify a specific correlation between the legalization of same-sex marriage and public opinion, the existence of a quantifiable relationship between the two concepts needs to be established. Despite the existing studies on the correlation between the legalization of same-sex marriage and public opinions, there are no formulated conclusions on the specific correlation because various works of literature have reached completely different answers. To identify the notable connections between these concepts, researchers commonly resort to content analysis to demonstrate the positive correlation of such topics. Content analysis can be defined as an analytical method that examines existing documents and communication artifacts to identify themes or patterns in a reliable and systematic manner. To enhance the depth of understanding in a field of study, it is important to understand how content analysis enables insightful research and how prior knowledge builds upon each other. Various other sources in regard to public opinion and constitutional law utilize content analysis as the main form of gathering data on social trend comprehension and policy implication analysis. In this way, quantitative content analysis was particularly well-suited for the aims of this research because it is more advantageous in obtaining general and broad data on a large subject. This research will be applied specifically to media and news representation to provide a complementary perspective on this debate that previous researchers have not yet found an answer to.

Methodology

Research Engine

The main methodology for this study is corpus analysis, which falls under the category of content analysis. Corpus analysis was conducted using mostly Sketch Engine, a research engine, by tracking keywords to record the changes in Taiwanese sentiments regarding same-sex marriage between 2016 and 2022 in the Taipei Times. The Taipei Times was established on June 15, 1999, with the objective of providing a distinctive viewpoint on the Taiwanese media landscape. The aim of the paper was to bridge the gap by delivering an English-language publication that would serve as a primary source of news for both local and international readers, featuring stories from a Taiwanese perspective (Deacon, 2007). Thus, it is the perfect form of media representation that would reflect public opinion and interests. Moreover, 75% of Taipei Times readers live in Taiwan, thereby enabling Taipei Times to provide relevant data to the discussion. The Taipei Times is an ideal platform to collect data because not only does its news reflect the perceptions of the public in various ways, but it also serves as a prime example of media representation.

Sketch Engine is a useful tool for managing and analyzing a wide range of corpora, with the ability to assist scholars in searching through large amounts of literature by utilizing a thesaurus, keywords, and phrases. Thus, it will be employed in this study to efficiently and effectively gather data and draw connections. In the present study, English-language publications of the Taipei Times from 2016 through 2022 were used to identify and analyze specific linguistic usage related to the research question.

Research Procedure

Before the application of Sketch Engine, articles were filtered out and downloaded from the official Taipei Times website. The texts with the keywords "gay marriage" and "same-sex marriage" were selected from the newspaper sites. To specifically locate relevant articles corresponding to the appropriate time period, the search function on the official Taipei Times website was used. Due to an issue with the Taipei Times search engine capping the capacity at months, it was not possible to obtain all the results for a year using a single search. However, the data were collected by utilizing the search engine to go through each individual year and month to reveal all the articles related to the search term "same-sex marriage." By reporting the title of the articles, publication dates, and the URL for each article, it became easy to track the number of articles published in each month of each year. The data could then be inputted into Sketch Engine after downloading the articles so as to find the specific amount of times a keyword or terminology appeared as well as the context it appeared in.

Sketch Engine enables a more efficient and compelling view of the language used in each article. By inputting all the relevant articles into Sketch Engine, it is possible to form concordances to discern the temporal and contextual occurrences of specific words within the articles. For example, searching "same-sex marriage" using Sketch Engine would reveal every time the term "same-sex marriage" appeared, as well as the context it was used within each separate year. Each appearance of the term was investigated to ascertain its relevance to the analyzed field, which involved examining the context in which the term appeared. Determining the number of appearances of the term "same-sex marriage" indicated the media representation of this specific concept.

At a secondary level, employing a similar procedure to identify negative and positive words used in conjunction with “same-sex marriage” would reveal the public sentiment during particular months and years. By creating separate concordances for “oppose,” “against,” “support,” and “advocate,” it was possible to ascertain how many times these words appeared. Subsequently, by looking through the context and collecting data on when these words appeared alongside same-sex marriage, Sketch Engine would review whether public perception was positive or negative during each year. Thus, by collecting data on the frequency of articles related to same-sex marriage and their content each year, a conclusion could be drawn on the relationship between the legalization of same-sex marriage and public opinion.

Results

Table 1

The number of appearances of specific terms

	“Same-sex Marriage”	“Oppose” within the context of same-sex marriage	“Against” within the context of same-sex marriage	“Support” within the context of same-sex marriage	“Advocate” within the context of same-sex marriage
2016	302	21	22	48	5
2017	520	32	40	59	27
2018	320	19	29	35	25
2019	400	15	26	31	19
2020	199	5	4	14	7
2021	117	4	2	10	5
2022	96	3	2	9	4

Table 1 depicts the total amount of appearances of the term “same-sex marriage” from 2016 to 2022 in the Taipei Times. Similarly, negative words such as “oppose” or “against” and positive words such as “support” or “advocate” were analyzed in a similar way to determine their usage and context in relation to same-sex marriage. The table indicates the exact number of times these positive and negative words were used to describe various public perceptions of same-sex marriage qualified through negative or positive words.

Table 2

The number of appearances of positive and negative words under the context of same-sex marriage

	Negative Words	Positive Words
2016	43	53
2017	72	86
2018	48	60
2019	41	50
2020	9	21
2021	6	15
2022	5	13

Using the previous table, Table 2 reveals the cumulative number of negative and positive words used to describe same-sex marriage in each year between 2016 and 2022. This analysis could be used to determine whether negative or positive words are used more frequently. Table 2 demonstrates the public perception of same-sex marriage by presenting a clear distinction between negative and positive terminology used in the media, providing insight into the general social beliefs surrounding the issue.

Discussion

Review of the Finding

The collected data demonstrate a positive relationship between the Taiwanese Supreme Court's legalization of same-sex marriage and public sentiment from 2016 to 2022 towards gay marriage, which supports the validity of various previous research that reached the conclusion that positive sentiments were more prevalent than negative sentiments, such as Yang's and Chen's research. However, this result conflicts with the two national referendums in 2018, where the majority of people cast their ballots against same-sex marriage equality. There are many explanations for this: the 2018 referendums were intentionally phrased in a way that emphasized traditional norms, causing voters to support specific norms without actually being against same-sex marriage (Chang, 2020). The national referendum is not the best reflection of public opinion because it addresses a multitude of other political and social repercussions that is beyond the scope of this research, which only seeks to analyze support or opposition to same-sex marriage legalization. Despite this conflict, this research, along with various other research that finds the same result, concludes a generally positive correlation between same-sex marriage legalization and public perception. But more importantly, this research establishes a new platform to analyze public opinion: media representation.

This suggests that the official recognition of same-sex marriage contributed to a higher level of tolerance and acceptance of same-sex marriage on a social level. The amount of media coverage and representation of the LGBT community reflects the public's support for news coverage, demonstrating a different perspective through this research. To be specific, between 2016 and 2019, the media representation of same-sex marriage was extremely high because of the ongoing debate on the legalization of same-sex marriage. The

abundance of articles on same-sex marriage published in the Taipei Times, a major source of news in Taiwan, indicates a trend of social support for increased LGBT representation. As such, Supreme Court rulings play a monumental role in shifting social perspectives on specific topics of debate in Taiwan. The gradual changes in public opinion are explored in the present study by analyzing the political and legal struggles on social issues. Using media representation as the foundation of this study, a positive correlation between the Supreme Court's affirmation of same-sex marriage and societal acceptance is found.

Another notable trend revealed through the data is the increase in opposing sentiment alongside the increase in positive representation of same-sex marriage, which can also be validated through various previous research. The increase in words such as “oppose” indicates an expansion of open disagreement toward same-sex marriages. However, when compared to the increase in positive sentiment, the data reflects a greater increase in proponents of same-sex marriage rather than opponents. Thus, despite the simultaneous increase in opponents speaking against same-sex marriage from 2016 to 2022, increasingly positive sentiments still persisted. Because the controversial debate over same-sex marriage grew over the years, it is expected that both proponents and opponents would become more vocal in expressing their views.

There are countless reasons why the legalization of same-sex marriage could contribute to this change in public perception. The most prominent explanation is that people may have a tendency to adhere to established traditions rather than embracing new concepts, but the largely publicized case of the Taiwanese Supreme Court ruling in favor of same-sex marriage despite traditional resistance may have brought this progressive social issue to the attention of citizens who had not previously considered it. Instead of automatically resulting in intolerance and hatred, the systematic changes in law likely caused people to ponder this debate with more nuance and depth, thereby creating an overall change in societal perception. Despite such change, this

same logic can also be applied to how opponents of same-sex marriage grew as a result of the legalization. As same-sex marriage gained more publicity, people who value more traditional lifestyles also expressed opposition to it. Ultimately, however, same-sex marriage still gained more support, rather than judgment, likely due to people adapting to more progressive and liberal views in Taiwan from 2016 to 2022. The amelioration of public perception reflected through media representation demonstrates a positive correlation between same-sex marriage legalization and public opinion.

Limitations

While this study has some strengths in terms of validity, there are also several limitations that may undermine its viability, particularly in more complex and nuanced research projects. Since the Taipei Times is the only existing prominent source of news published in English, there are no other sources for comparison, which limits the ability to strengthen the research results. Despite gathering data solely from the Taipei Times being sufficient to prove an ongoing social trend, the inclusion of data from more sources of news publications would increase the validity of the research, thereby strengthening the overall conclusion.

Sources of media bias must also be factored into the validity of this research. Because political and social bias in news publications is a known issue, it is possible that such bias could have influenced the results of the study toward the particular political or social stance of the Taipei Times. Without any significant news article publications to compare the data with, media bias becomes an even larger issue. Consequently, there are many other factors that contributed to the data and conclusion in addition to the Supreme Court ruling to legalize same-sex marriage. When considering the validity of the conclusion, it is imperative to consider these intertwined factors in conjunction with the

research results.

Finally, relying solely on articles as the sole indicator of public opinion can also undermine the robustness of the conclusion in this paper. The data collection process only involved the collection of news articles, while all other sources of media, such as videos, blogs, and photos, were not considered. Because these different sources of media present different perspectives on an issue, by limiting the application of the methodology to only new articles, the scope of analysis was significantly limited as a result. However, owing to the difficulties in finding a uniform and objective way to compare data found in videos to texts written on the internet, implementing a broader scope of data gathering could also be potentially worse. Regardless, the exclusion of other relevant forms of social perspective is an undeniable weakness of the study.

Contribution to Study

Despite the existence of existing studies in which the intricate details of same-sex marriage history were investigated, none correlate media representation of judicial cases to the shift in public perception. More importantly, the ongoing gap in research where there is no answer on precisely what kind of correlation exists between these two concepts is mended by this study. Content analysis is a prominent way of exploring similar social issues revolving around the specific field of public sentiment on same-sex marriage, including methodologies that implement the creation of large corpora analysis. However, there has been a scarcity of research on the correlations between constitutional law and public opinions using this methodology. Although previous studies have identified changes to the living conditions of the LGBT community, the effects of media attention on social attitudes have yet to be investigated. In this study, the gap in the existing literature on the relationship between legal changes and public opinion was addressed by conducting a

comprehensive analysis of previous studies and identifying a new trend relevant to the ongoing debate on same-sex marriage using media representation as the foundation of this study. The positive correlation between media representation of legalization and public opinion furthers the effectiveness of Taiwanese Judicial rulings as well as the respect towards the opinions of the Supreme Court.

Regarding this research's conclusion and methodology, both aspects significantly contribute to the trend of research. Understanding the actual impact of constitutional decisions on public opinion reveals the social significance of judicial decisions. This study goes beyond the simple recognition that the legalization of same-sex marriage leads to improved conditions, which can be attributed to various causes that do not necessarily eliminate social discrimination. Rather, this research reveals how social perception can change simultaneously as a result of legalization. Moreover, the high amount of media coverage indicated by the number of articles published between 2016 and 2019 reveals how media representation also contributes to the amelioration of public attitudes. The successful application of this methodology also reveals how similar types of corpus analysis can be applied to other areas of social science dealing with public opinion. This type of data collection and corpus analysis can be readily applied to other countries to investigate whether judicial decisions have comparable or distinct effects on social attitudes. Ultimately, this paper establishes a new form of scrutiny where media representation can be analyzed to reflect public opinion.

Future Implications

The findings of this study, in addition to revealing a social trend of increasing acceptance towards same-sex marriage, also re-establish the importance of the judicial institute, Judicial Yuan, in Taiwan. Although other

branches of government, such as the legislative and executive, deal with political and economic issues rather than social ones, the role of the Supreme Court in governing the application of constitutional law and protecting civil rights in domestic issues such as the debate over same-sex marriage is extremely nuanced. In addition to national recognition of same-sex marriage, which provides legal benefits such as financial distributions and anti-discrimination enforcement, the ruling also has implicit social changes. The results of this research exemplify the role of the Supreme Court and its modern significance on controversial social topics. While judicial rulings are still often a factor in political and economic concerns, the ability to cause tangible shifts in social viewpoint is a powerful tool for the federal government. Further, insights are provided into the social changes that occurred in Taiwan from 2016 to 2022, demonstrating the effectiveness of Judicial Yuan's decision to legalize same-sex marriage and its implications for future cases in Taiwan. Although the results of this study regarding the correlation between the legalization of same-sex marriage and public opinion can be applied to other issues, it may not yield as significant a change as seen with the highly publicized debate on same-sex marriage.

Calls for Further Research

LGBT social studies and history is a field that is only just beginning to emerge in mainstream academic institutions. As a result, few researchers have found a sufficient motive to pursue this area of research, especially in countries outside of the US. Throughout history, progressive social issues such as same-sex marriage have been largely ignored, resulting in a significant scarcity of relevant research in this area. The importance of understanding the relevant correlations between legal changes and social perspectives is an invaluable part of modern society. Lack of pursuit of knowledge in this field leads to a lack

of understanding of the nuances of how governmental alterations can impact public social sentiment. Such a deficit in comprehension and knowledge is a significant problem that needs to be addressed.

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2023年泰國政治動盪之評析

洪銘謙*

摘要

2023年是泰國政治史上最動盪的一年，從5月14日國會大選投票到8月22日選出總理，期間歷經三個多月的時間，是1932年君主立憲推動以來，最慢選出總理的一次，其關鍵因素在於2017年推出的第二十部憲法之規定，總理須由參眾議員共同選出，因此才造成贏得選舉卻不一定能獲得執政的狀況發生，最終國會第一大黨前進黨失去總理與眾議院國會議長寶座，淪為第一大在野黨，而第二大黨為泰黨透過合縱連橫成功讓友黨議員坐上眾議院國會議長並順勢拿下總理大位，讓為泰黨不僅贏得執政權力也透過與親軍方政黨合作讓流亡海外17年的前總理他信回國接受審判並順利獲得泰皇特赦。

以結果而言，他信與為泰黨可說是2023年泰國政治動盪之下的最大獲益者，但為泰黨為首的聯合政府能持續合作多久？紅黃和解是否真的可行？前進黨勢力是否會持續擴大？保守勢力是否會再度反撲？將成為泰國政治局勢穩定的關鍵，本文將以2023年泰國政治動盪後的新局面評析為泰黨政府上台後將面臨的挑戰。

關鍵字：前進黨、為泰黨、2023國會選舉、總理選舉、寫一本人民的憲法

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Commentary on Thailand's political turmoil in 2023

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Abstract

2023 is the most turbulent year in Thai political history. It took more than three months from the voting in the parliamentary election on May 14 to the election of the Prime Minister on August 22. It was the slowest election of the Prime Minister since the promotion of constitutional monarchy in 1932. The key factor lies in the stipulation of the 20th Constitution introduced in 2017 that the prime minister must be jointly elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. Therefore, winning the election may not necessarily lead to power. In the end, the largest party in Congress Move Forward Party lost the positions of Prime Minister and Speaker of the House of Representatives and became the largest opposition party. The Pheu Thai Party, the second largest party, successfully made a member of a friendly party the Speaker of the House of Representatives through alliances and took the opportunity to win the Prime Ministership. The Pheu Thai Party not only won the power to govern, but also cooperated with pro-military parties to allow former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who had been in exile overseas for 17 years, to return to the country to face trial and successfully obtain an amnesty from the Thai King.

In terms of results, Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party can be said to be the biggest beneficiaries of Thailand's political turmoil in 2023, but how long can the coalition government headed by the Pheu Thai Party continue to cooperate?

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Is red-yellow reconciliation really feasible? Will the Kadima Party's power continue to expand? Will conservative forces fight back again? It will become the key to the stability of Thailand's political situation. This article will analyze the new situation after Thailand's political turmoil in 2023 and analyze the challenges that the Pheu Thai Party government will face after it comes to power.

Keywords: Move Forward Party, Pheu Thai Party, 2023 parliamentary election, prime minister election, writing a people's constitution

壹、2023 年泰國國會大選

2023年5月14日泰國舉行國會大選，此次選舉是依據泰國第二十部憲法《2017年泰國憲法》實施以來的第二次選舉。在國會議員的選舉制度方面，選民共有兩張選票，分別是區域選票與政黨選票，區域選票共選出400席眾議員，政黨選票則依據比例選出100席眾議員。在總理選舉制度方面，候選人可以不具備眾議員身份，每個政黨最多可以推出三位總理候選人，不過真的有推出三位總理候選人的政黨並不多，只有泰勇敢發展黨（Chartpattanakla Party）、為泰黨（Pheu Thai Party）以及泰建泰黨（Thai Sang Thai Party），其他政黨多以一到兩位為主。在投票制度方面，本次選舉同樣規定國民有投票之義務，投票方式可採用遠端郵寄投票或提前投票，提前投票日為5月7日。

本屆選舉結果相當出乎預料，原本泰國媒體與學者都認為得票數順序為：¹為泰黨、前進黨（Move Forward Party）、泰自豪黨（Bhumjaithai Party）等，但最終結果卻是前進黨一舉從第三大黨變成第一大黨，為泰黨維持第二大黨不變，而泰自豪黨如民調預期成為第三大黨。各政黨在眾議院的席次為：前進黨152席（區域112、政黨39）、為泰黨141席（區域112、政黨29）、泰自豪黨71席（區域67、政黨3）、人民國家力量黨40席（Palang Pracharath Party）（區域39、政黨1）、合泰建國黨36席（United Thai Nation Party）（區域23、政黨13）、民主黨25席（Democrat Party）（區域22、政黨3）、其他政黨合計36席（區域24、政黨12）。以區域席次而言，前進黨與為泰黨的席次都是112席（前進黨25.40%、為泰黨24.54%），顯示前進黨在區域上的經營已經有一定成效，但前進黨在政黨席次方面仍居第一（前進黨38.01%、為泰黨28.86%），顯示前進黨在全國支持度明顯領先為泰黨與其他政黨。

本屆大選保守派大敗的主因在於親軍方保守勢力分裂為兩個政黨，時

¹ 〈2023年眾議院500席之民調資料〉，泰國媒體《Thestandard》，連結：<https://election2566.thestandard.co>

任總理巴育（Prayut Chan-o-cha）代表合泰建國黨，而副總理巴威（Prawit Wongsuwon）代表原本的人民國家力量黨，使得原本2019年獲得116席的人民國家力量黨，在本屆選舉僅獲得40席，而巴育帶領的新政黨合泰建國黨也僅獲得36席，兩黨合計為76席，與2019年大選結果相比流失了40席。不過同樣為巴育政府執政聯盟的政黨，泰自豪黨在本屆大選不僅沒有流失席次，反而還增加了20席，可說是本屆大選當中保守派勢力的黑馬，而民主黨自2019年投入親軍方勢力後，其支持度就不斷下滑，2019年還有53席但本屆大選後僅剩下25席，與當年身為反他信（Thaksin Chinnawat）陣營的主將有相當大的落差。整體而言，2023年國會大選是泰國政黨體系的大洗牌，從選前的紅藍兩大派勢力到選後明確分成紅、橘、藍三大派勢力，²國會大選後的政黨政治協商也從總理選舉及組成聯合政府階段展開。

貳、延宕多次的第三十屆總理選舉

本次泰國總理選舉延宕多次的主因在於《2017年泰國憲法》規定，總理必須經由參議院250席議員與眾議院500席議員投票選出，此規定適用於2019年至2024年五年之內的總理選舉，換而言之本次總理投票是參議院250席議員最後一次參與總理投票，因此即便大家都知道參議院250席議員多數為軍方與親軍方人士擔任，但同樣不斷喊話期盼參議員在任期的最後一次投票時，能投票支持代表人民之聲的多數黨政府。但誰都沒想到這所謂的最後一次投票竟然變成兩次，且光是總理選舉投票日期就延後了三次。

國會選舉結果底定後，由於各政黨都沒有單獨過半，因此新政府肯定要以聯合政府模式運作，依據內閣制的傳統由第一大黨前進黨優先組閣，原本外界都認為前進黨會直接從眾議院獲得超過376席，這樣就不需要在意親軍方的參議院250席選票，因此當時學者與媒體都認為第三大黨泰自

² 此處提到的紅藍與紅橘藍是以泰國當地新聞用政黨顏色去區分，而非以往泰國政治當中的紅黃衫軍兩派的概念，不過藍派支持者與過去的黃衫軍支持者有部分重疊。

豪黨將成為關鍵少數，若有泰自豪黨的71席，加上前進黨與為泰黨等泛民主派陣營，要超過376席是絕對沒有問題的，但就在當時流亡海外的前總理他信透過媒體喊話，認為直接組成超過376席的超大聯合政府會使眾議院的運作失去平衡，並可能引來保守派的反撲，建議前進黨應該努力尋求參議院議員支持。最終前進黨聯合為泰黨與六個小黨組成「八黨聯盟」在7月18日迎來第一輪總理投票，不過最終僅獲得前進黨的八黨聯盟僅獲得贊成票324，來自參議院的支持票只有13票，比正式投票前預計的選票來得更少，這點皮塔在後續的活動上親口直言，當時有參議員在投票前說要支持，結果投票當天卻飛出國了，而這也與7月18日參議員投票的狀況類似，因為參議院250席的投票結果是，贊成13票、反對34票以及不表態159票，其中這些不表態的參議員就包含總理投票當天缺席者。

第二輪投票之前，前進黨準備反擊參議員，因此打算提出修改憲法272條，取消參議員可以的總理投票權益，但最終第二輪投票時，反對勢力透過眾議員與參議員的人數優勢，否決前進黨第二次提名皮塔，同時皮塔也被泰國中選會以持有媒體股份取消國會議員身份，雖然後續前進黨也向憲法法庭提出申訴，認為國會表決的結果不應該凌駕憲法，因為憲法並沒有規定同一位候選人不能二度提名，不過前進黨也正式失去組閣權利，改由國會第二大黨為泰黨負責籌組聯合政府。在此期間，7月21日為泰黨與八黨聯盟夥伴一同喊話，表示不會與軍方勢力合作，強調泛民主派團結的決心，同時透過聯盟內的眾議員議長以前進黨向憲法法庭提出訴訟為由推遲總理選舉日，與此同時保守勢力也對為泰黨喊話，堅持有前進黨就無法合作，其中第三大黨泰自豪黨也強調為泰黨只能從泰自豪黨跟前進黨選擇一個。

7月26日流亡海外17年的泰國前總理他信對外宣布，他將於8月10日返回泰國接受審判震驚泰國政壇。7月28日眾議院議長就宣布第三輪投票日為8月4日，而為泰黨總理候選人謝塔在8月2日也正式對外宣布，為泰黨聯合政府不會有前進黨，但同時也強調不會找軍方勢力政黨加入執政聯盟，正式宣告「八黨聯盟」解散以及紅橘勢力正式分家，由於八黨聯盟解散原訂8月4日舉行的第三輪總理投票只能再度延遲，此時原本被貼上「軍方

黨」的合泰建國黨與人民國家力量黨就出面喊話，強調時任看守內閣的巴育總理與巴威副總理已經不參與政黨事務，因此兩黨不算是軍方政黨了。而原本預計8月10日回泰國的前總理他信在此期間就不斷被傳出會延後回國，不過他的女兒佩通坦則不斷澄清謠言，直到8月5日他信自己發文確定會延後，但強調會在8月底回國。

8月7日為泰黨公開與泰自豪黨合作，此時仍強調「沒有前進黨、也沒有軍方黨」，8月9日他信之女佩通坦帶著為泰黨時任黨主席春楠（Chonlanan Srikaew）前往前進黨黨部商討尋求前進黨支持但宣告失敗，8月11日人民國家力量黨便對外公告將支持為泰黨，8月16日泰國憲法法庭以提出訴訟者並非權利受損者為由，拒絕前進黨提出的申訴，而皮塔後續也公開宣佈不會提出個人申訴，正式宣告與總理大位無緣。同日眾議院議長便宣布8月22日為總理投票日，三天後8月19日前總理他信也宣告將於8月22日返回泰國。最終為泰黨選擇與合泰建國黨及人民國家力量黨接洽，最終為泰黨、泰自豪黨、合泰建國黨、人民國家力量黨以及七個小黨組成「十一黨聯盟」，對此他信之女佩通坦於8月20日活動時提到「因為為泰黨無法單獨過半，不得不跟其他政黨合作，對選民感到很抱歉」。8月22日早上，泰國前總理他信的私人飛機抵達曼谷廊曼機場並開始移送法院進行審判流程，同天下午為泰黨總理候選人謝塔在總數750席當中以482高票獲得參議院330票以及眾議院152票的支持確定當選。³

以結果而言，這場延宕三個多月的總理選舉可說是他信與為泰黨的勝利，從一開始他信喊話要前進黨不要直接在眾議院尋求376票到為泰黨跟前進黨爭奪眾議院議長一職，甚至選前不斷有人在媒體放話為泰黨準備跟親軍方政府合作等等，都讓這場世紀的紅黃和解與他信結束17年海外流亡選擇歸國的結果，有著他信與泰國軍方聯合規劃著陰謀算計的氛圍，但若

³ 〈2023年8月22日第三十屆總理選舉結果〉，泰國媒體《Thestandard》新聞連結：<https://www.google.com.tw/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fthestandard.co%2F30th-prime-minister-vote-22082023-14%2F&psig=AOvVaw2iCpBdb84UOTmvK0rOgceK&ust=1696643841891000&source=images&cd=vfe&opi=89978449&ved=0CBEQjRxqFwoTCLDP-2o4IEDFQAAAAAdAAAAABAE>

以國會第一大黨前進黨的反應而言，或許前進黨早知道為泰黨與親軍方政黨合作是一種可能存在的必然結果，因為早在八黨聯盟的合作階段時，為泰黨就與前進黨達成協議，為泰黨會全力支持前進黨組閣，但如果前進黨組閣失敗，那希望前進黨也可以支持為泰黨組閣，不過在第一輪總理選舉結果出來後，前進黨與為泰黨就已經清楚，如果第二輪的聯盟組合仍然沒有改變的話，那最終前進黨跟為泰黨兩黨都可能成為在野黨，因為以現實而言，第三大黨泰自豪黨只要跟軍方政黨合作，完全可以透過參議員250席的支持獲得組閣與執政權，因此當為泰黨去尋求前進黨支持未果後，前進黨應該也能理解為泰黨後續的選擇與動向，畢竟沒有執政就無法帶來改變。對於前進黨而言，該黨堅持的修改污辱皇室法（簡稱：112法）是核心精神，所以當其他政黨不斷強調「只要前進黨放棄修改112法就可以合作」時，對前進黨而言也是一種挑戰，對前進黨而言這樣做可能能夠獲得執政權力，但同時也可能在下一場選舉失去人民的支持，因此前進黨的堅持也是造成最終由為泰黨與親軍方政黨合作的另外一個重要因素。

參、為泰黨聯合政府面臨的挑戰

早在8月22日總理選舉前，為泰黨確定與親軍方勢力合作的時候，就不斷傳出「9位眾議員席次換1位部長」的傳言，由於為泰黨聯合政府有11個政黨組成，因此聯合政府的內閣最終也淪為分贓政治的結果，不過當下泰國處於後疫情時代、烏俄戰爭及中美貿易戰等國際情勢造成泰國經濟成長緩慢，急需透過擅長經濟政策的為泰黨來改變泰國經濟走勢，因此9月5日公布的第一屆為泰黨聯合政府內閣名單當中；為泰黨拿到財政部、國防部、外交部、公衛部、商務部、交通部、經濟與社會部、旅遊與體育部以及文化部等九個部門。泰自豪黨拿到內政部、勞動部、教育部以及高教科學研創部等四個部門。兩個親軍方政黨拿到四個部門，分別是合泰建國黨拿到工業部與能源部，人民國家力量黨拿到農業部與自然環境資源部。兩個地區型政黨獲得兩個部門，民族黨獲得司法部，泰國發展黨獲得社會發

展與人類安全部。⁴

以內閣部長分配結果而言為泰黨雖然分到最多部長，但基本上都與國際事務有關，其中就包含與中國要密切持續推動的中泰高鐵建設的交通部以及推動經濟政策的經濟與社會部，在協調部會首長期間，原本國防部外傳將由泰自豪黨阿努廷要拿下，但後來新任總理謝塔（Srettha Thavisin）與前任總理巴育會面後，最終變成泰黨負責國防部，而原本呼聲最高與軍方關係較好的阿努廷則獲得最大部門內政部，可見為泰黨聯合政府仍有一定程度受到軍方勢力影響，但這與後續前總理他信獲得泰皇特赦或許相關，他信回國接受審判進入特殊收押不久，就傳出有許多病狀需要醫治，轉送警察醫院照護，後續也獲得泰皇特赦刑期從八年剩下一年。⁵

選擇與為泰黨分道揚鑣的前進黨也並未放棄持續在全國各地增加影響力，前進黨與民間團體ilaw合作推動「寫一本人民的憲法」議案，⁶獲得人民支持已突破連署門檻送至眾議院審查。前進黨在執政失利成為在野黨之後的第一場選戰來自泰國東部的羅勇府，原本羅勇府的前進黨眾議員因憲法法庭判決失去眾議員身份，泰國中選會公告於9月10日進行補選，結果前進黨推出的人選不僅再度勝選，獲得39296票，比原本五月份的29000多出一萬多票，顯示前進黨雖然失去執政權力，但仍然受到泰國民眾的歡迎，且原本力挺為泰黨的泛民主派選民也可能改支持前進黨，因此前進黨聲勢持續高漲。但也由於前進黨需要有領袖持續在眾議院帶領反對勢力，因此失去眾議員身份的前進黨前總理皮塔於9月15日宣告辭去黨魁一職選擇成為前進黨顧問，並於9月23日經由前進黨黨內選舉，選出來自泰國南

⁴ 2023/09/05〈謝塔政府名單〉，泰國媒體《Thaipbs》<https://www.thaipbs.or.th/now/infographic/201>

⁵ 看見泰國編輯團隊，2023/09/04。〈泰国前总理他信获王室特赦8年减刑至1年〉，泰國華文媒體《看見泰國》，連結：<https://visionthai.net/zh-hans/article/thailand-thaksin-sentence-reduce-1-year-royal/>

⁶ 〈請問謝塔，是否能以總理的立場承諾人民將推動一本新憲法？〉。前進黨官方粉專貼文。<https://www.facebook.com/MoveForwardPartyThailand/posts/pfbid0s34AC6Qkggxoj6uUhxfa85rbH9gGyFm2DoqCRU8sFS2toih17f9HrvWBpNuFUoRSI>

部畢業於朱拉隆功大學理工背景的柴塔瓦督拉通 (Chaithawat Tulathon) 擔任新任黨魁繼續帶領前進黨監督為泰黨政府施政，柴塔瓦成為黨魁後，隨即於 10 月推出前進黨新策略，預計於 2023 年達到全國十萬黨員的目標，並且透過 MPF Today App 推播前進黨最新訊息，同時以每年募款一百萬泰銖來運作黨務以成為人民的政黨為目標。

肆、結語

2023 年泰國政治相當動盪的一年，為泰黨從原本選前的泛民主派到選後變成與軍方合作的聯合政黨，立場轉換之大恐怕不是每一位紅黃之爭世代的人能都能接受的，但是現階段泰國經濟持續處於低迷，需要有改善經濟狀況背景的為泰黨出來帶領，因此紅黃兩派應該能接受暫時的和解，除非經濟發展狀況無法獲得改善甚至又再度發生嚴重影響國內經濟的事件，如當年前總理英拉的大米收購事件，才可能導致紅黃兩派再度分家。另一個值得關注的時間點是參議院議員任期，由於憲法規定總理選舉須由參眾議員 750 席共同選出的「272 法」只適用至 2024 年，屆時為泰黨是否會與親軍方政黨拆夥，原本「八黨聯盟」是否會重修舊好，將成為影響後續泰國政局發展的關鍵因素，而這一切須等到 2024 年他信重獲自由以及 272 法過期後才能得知。

參考資料

- 為泰黨臉書粉專：<https://www.facebook.com/pheuthaiparty>
- 前進黨臉書粉專：<https://www.facebook.com/MoveForwardPartyThailand>
- 合泰建國黨臉書粉專：<https://www.facebook.com/unitedthaination>
- 人民國家力量黨臉書粉專：<https://www.facebook.com/PPRPThailand>
- 羅勇補選結果：https://www.khaosod.co.th/politics/news_7859487
- 洪博泰愛講臉書粉專：<https://www.facebook.com/drhonglaothai>

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2023/05/12 〈泰國政治的「家族潛規則」：不只是華裔富豪，原來前總理他信還是蘭納王國的王族後裔〉，關鍵評論網，網址：<https://www.thenewslens.com/feature/2023thaige/185106>

淡江大學《國際與區域研究期刊》

徵稿啟事

本刊係「淡江大學國際事務學院」發行之中文學術性半年刊，以探討亞太及區域研究等議題為宗旨，每年刊行兩期（六月、十二月），接受專題論文、時事評論及書評之投稿，領域包括政治、經濟、社會、文化、歷史、法律等。本刊隨時接受來稿，接受稿件之刊登時間依審查進度而定，歡迎各界踴躍投稿。

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參、註釋體例（採取頁下註）

一、官方文件

(一) 中文：官署機構，〈文件名稱〉（行政命令類）或《文件名稱》（法律類），卷期（案號），日期，頁x或頁xx。

【例】中華民國國防部，《國防報告書》，2011年，頁24。

(二) 外文：Author's Full Name, "Title of the Article," Date, Section or Page Numbers.

【例】ROC Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report, 2011, p. 24.

二、專書

(一) 中文：作者姓名，《書名》（出版地：出版者，出版年），頁x或頁x-x。

【例】鈕先鍾，《中國戰略思想新論》（臺北：麥田，2003年），頁1-10。

(二) 外文：Author’s Full Name, Complete Title of the Book (Place of Publication: Publisher, Year), p. x or pp. x-x.

【例】Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-based Models of Competition and Collaboration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 28.

三、專書譯著

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十三、第二次引註

首次引註須註明完整的資料來源（如上例），第二次以後之引註可採以下格式：作者姓名，《書刊名稱》或〈篇名〉或特別註明之「簡稱」，頁x或頁x-x。

如全文中僅引該作者之一種作品，則可更為簡略為：同註x，頁x或頁x-x。

肆、參考文獻用例

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(七) 官方文件

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